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nsExecutive Summary
Evidence suggests that the structural 
composition of European industry is the reason 
behind many of the challenges faced by research 
policy in Europe. The R&D shortfall in Europe 
relative to key trading partners, for example, is 
largely due to Europe having a smaller share of 
its economy composed of high R&D-intensive 
sectors (compared to the US or Japan).
Similar structurally-dependent arguments 
have been made about the disciplinary 
specialisation of research efforts in European 
universities and public research institutes: efforts 
seem to be spread out across multiple areas 
failing to reach critical mass. 
As a result, the question of “R&D 
specialisation” has emerged as an issue of debate 
on the research policy agenda. But what is this 
question and why should we bother with it?
To explore this question and examine its 
implications for policy, the Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) - Institute for Prospective Technological 
Studies (IPTS), together with Directorate General 
for Research (DG RTD), organised a workshop 
in Barcelona on 30 June 2008. This report is an 
edited compilation of contributions submitted by 
participants at this event.
The question boils down to whether, for 
any given geographical-political entity, there are 
benefits to having R&D efforts concentrated (or 
specialised) in a limited number of thematic areas 
and, if so, whether
(a) public funding of R&D should focus on 
these areas accordingly and
(b) corporate R&D investment should be 
steered towards these areas through structural 
changes to the economy (and how to achieve 
this).
Examining whether there are benefits to 
the specialisation of R&D implies looking at the 
quality (and not just the quantity) of R&D. This is a 
change in orientation compared to the emphasis, 
implied or explicit, on reaching a given target of 
R&D spending.
Good quality R&D is productive R&D: it 
effectively transforms inputs into output (both 
measured by whatever means). And, in times of 
economic crisis where “bang-for-the-buck” is 
being emphasised, this effectiveness of R&D is as 
important as ever.
Research on the benefits of specialisation is 
still in early stages, and robust evidence is scant. 
However, some points can already be regarded 
as beyond serious dispute. 
For example, it is clear that reaching critical 
mass is necessary in certain thematic areas. 
Unless you reach this threshold, the effectiveness 
of R&D efforts will be suboptimal.
Yet there are limits to the benefits of 
specialisation, as the law of diminishing returns 
should kick in at one point or another.
Not all thematic areas are equally “fertile”: 
some (especially novel ones such as Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICT) and 
biotechnology) present many more opportunities 
for making significant discoveries than others. 
Enlarging the size of a market (such as the 
market for knowledge in an integrated European 
Research Area (ERA)) can lead to increased 
specialisation provided there is unrestricted 
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will pick up remaining complementary tasks. 
A larger market can also lead to greater 
competition in an area. The stakes are much 
larger and more attractive and challengers to any 
single agent “monopolising” a certain activity can 
emerge.
Is there a role for policy in this setting? 
Without hard evidence, discussion will 
inevitably be constrained to speculation – though 
some broad contours can be identified. 
Assuming the dissipation of European 
research efforts is true, specialising in – and 
reallocating resources to – a limited number of 
thematic areas would (a) free up funds from sub-
optimal areas and (b) give some thematic areas a 
better chance of becoming globally competitive.
But not all research actors are capable 
of shifting their thematic focus to the most 
“productive” areas, due to a number of factors. 
So specialising in a few thematic areas would 
benefit some research actors (and by extension 
places) more than others.
Too little specialisation may spread 
resources more evenly around Europe but fall 
short of achieving a strong impact. Too much 
specialisation might lead to stronger impact, but 
could have negative implications in terms of anti-
competitive outcomes, growth trajectories, etc. 
For one, policies favouring specialisation would 
reduce variety – a principal source of scientific 
novelty and key long-term determinant of 
scientific and technological leadership. 
Also, specialising in a limited number of 
areas may lead a research system to become 
locked in a specific trajectory and would affect its 
long-term resilience, i.e. its ability to respond to 
exogenous changes. 
The challenge for policy, therefore, is to find 
the right balance between too much and too little 
specialisation, in the context of the ERA vision 
and the Lisbon Strategy objectives.
But how such an optimal balance may be 
attained is the key question – the precise nature 
of policy interventions, if any, is far from clear.
Different takes on specialisation
The contributions by the participants at the 
Barcelona workshop address many of the issues 
raised by the question of specialisation. In doing 
so, they contribute novel insights to the debate.
Dimitrios Kyriakou (JRC-IPTS) cautions that 
policy approaches depending overwhelmingly 
on a few select fields or sectors are particularly 
vulnerable to systemic risk, which is alive and 
well as the current economic crisis has shown. 
Dominique Foray (Ecole Polytechnique 
Fédérale de Lausanne) presents the issue of 
specialisation from a regional perspective. He 
argues that the free exchange of knowledge in 
Europe can lead to a situation in which a few 
“winner” regions specialise in a few topics, 
leading to “desertification” of R&D activities 
elsewhere. What can regions do so they don’t 
end up being left behind? “Smart specialisation” 
in thematic areas that make the most of a region’s 
current knowledge base is the appropriate 
response, it is argued, as much for Cambridge as 
it is for Andalucía. 
Phil Cooke (University of Cardiff) addresses 
the trade-off between too much and too little 
specialisation. Specialise too much and you 
might end up losing out on benefits that would 
have been produced by R&D in areas that are 
being neglected, as you never know where the 
next bright innovation will come from. So it is 
necessary to maintain a certain amount of related 
variety.
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is one of healthy related variety or a situation 
where R&D is fragmented and duplicated, leading 
to suboptimal results? Keith Smith (University of 
Tasmania) argues that to answer this question we 
need to go beyond traditional statistics and delve 
further into disaggregated data.
The argument for specialisation hinges on 
the quality of R&D. But this assumes that there 
is a quality science base to begin with, and 
that further specialisation would try to make 
the most of it. Andrea Bonaccorsi (University of 
Pisa) argues that there is a strong link between 
economic competitiveness and a strong science 
base. 
Mark Harrison (University of Warwick) 
cautions that the evidence on the link between 
high-quality research and critical mass is weak 
and, drawing examples from the economic 
history of Soviet R&D, argues that policy-induced 
concentration in R&D is unproductive in the 
long-run. Is the current debate merely part of an 
institutional cycle?
As has been shown, the question 
of specialisation has a number of policy 
implications. It can lead the way towards a 
more rigorous and evidence-based allocation 
of research funding. It can also help understand 
why Europe is lagging behind in R&D investment. 
Antanas enys (Vilnius Gediminas Technical 
University, Lithuania) presents an overview of 
factors that account for this deficit viewed from 
the perspective of specialisation.
But the question of specialisation, while 
fruitful and potentially insightful, will not make the 
business of creating an R&D policy mix any easier. 
If anything, it will make it more complicated. 
Anastasios Giannitsis (University of Athens) shows 
policies for strengthening specialisation must 
be placed in their proper context, and outlines 
complementary interventions that can support 
both specialisation and long-term flexibility.
Finally, Dimitrios Pontikakis (JRC-IPTS), 
George Chorafakis (DG-RTD A3) and Dimitrios 
Kyriakou (JRC-IPTS) present some stylised 
expectations attached to specialisation, both 
positive and negative. How can policy overcome 
the dilemmas? A case is made for policy 
approaches that are concerned more with the 
long-term shifting capacity of research systems 
and less with micromanaging the direction of 
research.
10
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Many voices raise concern that European 
research efforts are spread too thinly. Soete 
(2005) attributes the alleged lack of excellence in 
European universities, vis-à-vis their counterparts 
in the United States, partly to the dissipation 
of research efforts. Foray and Van Ark (2007) 
argue that some research specialisation at the 
level of regions or countries would strengthen 
the international competitiveness of European 
research and help make Europe a more attractive 
destination for R&D investment. Others still, see 
the policy drive towards specialisation as an 
opportunity for a shift towards mission-oriented 
research that could contribute towards tackling 
the Grand Challenges (Georghiou, 2008) the 
EU is faced with in the form of climate change, 
energy and changing demographics. 
Between the summer of 2008 when we held 
a workshop on specialisation in R&D and early 
2009, when participants’ papers were received 
for this volume, something very important 
happened: the financial crisis entered its “no-
plausible-deniability” phase and the ongoing 
profound economic downturn became painful 
evident. It would be wrong not to take this 
development into account because in many 
ways much of the impetus for many arguments 
in favour of one policy or another came from the 
apparent systemic reduction of risk in previous 
years. Such a reduction of risk proved a figment 
of the imagination –and wishful thinking- of many 
analysts and market participants.
A systemic reduction of risk would make it 
defensible for bankers, analysts and policymakers 
to place many or all eggs in one basket. It would 
justify concentrating resources where apparently 
returns were highest and nothing seemed to 
threaten them. That could be oil technology and 
exploration, financial engineering, telecoms, 
software, etc. Monoculture, or near-monoculture 
economies seemed attractive. One of every ten 
pounds received in the United Kingdom (UK) 
in 2006 were in banking; the rate in New York 
was one of every three. Huge compensation 
in favoured monoculture industries attracted 
researchers and new talent. Junior associates’ 
average compensation was around $US240,000 
(bottoming out at around $US150000 ) in 2000 – 
triple what it would be for Master’s, MBA or PhD 
holders in other sectors (Freeman et al. 2001). 
Young bright minds paid attention: as mentioned 
by Ferguson (2008), back in 1970 5% of Harvard’s 
graduating class went into finance, 15% by 1990, 
and more than 20% by 2007. Yale had Harvard 
beat – it had higher percentages already in the 
eighties.
Diversification is the appropriate response 
when faced with risk. The successive bubbles of 
the last 20+ years, the nearly-continuous growth 
in the United States (US) with small blimps in 
the early 1990s and early 2000s, the apparent 
superannuation of inflation, etc. made serious 
systemic risk seem very small. Portfolio models 
developed since the seventies were touted to 
provide financial diversity to substitute for the 
real diversity that was becoming increasingly out 
of fashion.
The financial crisis shook this emphasis on 
concentrating resources where at present you 
see largest rewards in two ways: it showed that 
profound, systemic risk is still alive and well; and 
it showed that when markets collapse financial 
Introduction
Dimitrios Kyriakou
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies 
Joint Research Centre, European Commission
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you hoped they would – largely because your 
counterparts in these hedging transactions are 
unable/unwilling to hold their side of the deal.
In the light of the ongoing crisis, one needs 
particularly heroic assumptions to promote 
increased concentration for any activity expected 
to generate economic benefits. The Barcelona 
workshop and the contributions to this volume 
provided a rich pre-crisis debate. Thankfully 
there are important arguments in this debate that 
escape the irrational exuberance of minimal-risk 
environments; to these we turn next, keeping 
always in mind the powerful caveat emptor world 
markets have delivered in the last few months.
There are quite well-known arguments, 
in all activities, including research, in favour of 
concentrating efforts and resources in an area of 
specialisation, presumably in the area in which 
an economic agent/group/region/country has the 
most stellar/excellent record. The idea dates at 
least to Adam Smith, and was updated by Ricardo 
in the context of exchanging the fruits of diverse 
specialisations among agents, and through 
focusing not on what is best at doing, but on what 
one is least bad at doing.
The appeal, and the arguments, of focusing 
on getting the most bang-for-the-buck are 
straightforward. They require however a certain 
set of assumptions in order to work, such as free 
and unfettered exchange, and the absence of 
powerful stochastic shocks against the activity in 
which one has specialised, or the ability to use 
financial instruments as insurance against such 
shocks. This in turn requires either the absence 
of multiple individual sovereign states, or the 
impossibility of any sovereign state exercising its 
sovereignty in unpredictable ways (e.g. regarding 
impeding capital flows, expropriations, wars, 
etc.). Within individual countries specialisation 
among regions/communities is accompanied by 
strong central budgets which through tax-and-
transfer schemes, targeted development assistance 
programmes, and infrastructural investment 
distribute benefits and smooth out the differential 
gains generated by the different activities in which 
different regions have specialised. 
In the absence of the above the specialisation/
concentration approach becomes hard to 
fathom; indeed most countries do not specialise 
overwhelmingly in the activity in which they 
would get the most bang-for-the-buck. The few 
that have tried it (e.g. mono-cultivation agricultural 
economies focusing on coffee, cocoa in Africa) 
paid dearly for it when the first negative shock 
hit. Their counterparts in terms of regions within 
countries (e.g. mining areas in industrialised 
countries) have also suffered downturns when 
their “mono-product” economy was hit; luckily 
for them, however, a strong central budget was 
usually there to help mitigate the extent of their 
income drop.
One should note that there are also arguments 
against overspecialisation not simply based on 
distributional/cohesion issues, and the absence 
of the necessary accompanying institutions, but 
even in terms of pure efficiency. Such arguments 
underscore the importance of flexible responses, 
shifting capacity, and dynamic assignment of 
resources. They apply in dealing with a dynamic 
setting in which what may seem optimal today 
may not be so tomorrow, as well as when faced 
with the emergence of monopolies/monopsonies 
favoured by ever-higher concentration. Note 
also that hedging strategies developed in and for 
financial markets in recent decades, to protect 
one against the risks of concentration have 
received quite a beating in the current financial 
crisis, casting shadow on one tool which could 
be used towards hedged concentration strategies 
– there is not enough space to do justice to this 
issue here by exploring it further.
As a starting point made for any policy-
relevant analysis one should not generically 
recommend either more or less centralisation; 
rather one should take into account the sort 
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implement policies. Another point worth stressing 
is that much of the theorising about making 
more efficient the production and diffusion of 
knowledge and innovation is expressed in terms 
of correcting market failures, while assuming that 
such markets encompassing all aspects of the 
production and diffusion process are in operation. 
Here again the current crisis with the drying up 
of markets for key transactions it has provoked 
should give us pause, when we assume markets 
will exist to smooth out the effect of shocks.
As mentioned above there is a large 
underlying concern about the existence of 
effective mechanisms (markets, fiscal schemes, 
smooth diffusion/absorption, etc) for the 
distribution of any welfare gains emerging from 
R&D concentration, beyond the region/state 
which is the seat of such concentration. Perhaps 
it would be useful to discuss this more explicitly. 
Concentrating research where the return on 
each euro spent is the highest, may make short 
run sense for a profit-maximising firm (though 
possibly inefficient in the medium to long run). 
However, it is quite likely politically infeasible and 
inefficient, not least because governments focus 
on welfare in their state first and foremost. Such 
welfare may depend on the ways welfare gains 
are distributed, on local externalities from R&D, 
on the stickiness of knowledge and researcher 
flows. It also depends on overall human capital 
levels in a country, and which depend, in turn, 
on the country’s distance from the technological 
frontier. 
The costs and benefits of further concentration 
of resources should be weighed very carefully, 
in a context where governments have been 
repeatedly told by experts that R&D and human 
capital development are key drivers of economic 
welfare; where knowledge diffusion/absorption 
is very slow when R&D and human capital are 
weak; and where there is no distribution of 
welfare gains such as exists in a federal state. 
This is even more so when alternative approaches 
exist, emphasising flexible assignment of 
resources and shifting capacity, while avoiding 
monoculture approaches, which become 
exceedingly vulnerable in a deep downturn, such 
as the current one.
It is not as often stressed but, nevertheless, 
monopsony can be pernicious, just as much as 
monopoly. Research centres tend to have more 
autonomy when they do not depend on a single 
authority (similarly researchers in a research field 
are more autonomous when they do not depend 
on one funding source, or one mega-centre of 
research in that field). Concentration of power 
regarding funding decisions in an area of science 
in one centre subjects scientists to the exorbitant 
power of that single buyer/funder of their ideas/
talents. 
The US system works – to the extent it does – 
through the availability of a multitude of funding 
sources at various different levels, giving proposals 
many different opportunities to be considered 
and funded. This is what an earlier meeting of 
the Knowldege-for-Growth (KfG1) group, advising 
Commissioner Potocnik, vividly termed “the art 
of creating productive chaos”, characterising 
the US system. On the other hand, in the US the 
government’s role is important not only in terms 
of spreading the benefits from technical advances 
concentrated in Silicon Valley, or Route 128, or 
Route. 1, or Raleigh-Durham, etc. It is coupled by 
a strong federal role in R&D funding. This, while 
not straitjacketing local or state funding, provides 
an important anchor and reference point.
As hinted above, tensions regarding 
concentration can be partly attributed to the 
success of R&D and innovation studies, which 
underscored technology as a key discretionary 
ingredient of economic success. These arguments 
identified the role of technical progress as 
reflected in the residual in growth accounting, 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/monitoring/
knowledge_en.htm
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technology absorption, linking it with the ability 
to reap benefits from positive economic shocks, 
adjust to negative economic shocks, and to forge 
dynamic comparative advantage (such as Japan, 
or Finland did). 
These insights, coupled with the persistent 
stickiness in the diffusion/absorption of 
knowledge, and in light of the advantages enjoyed 
by those in the vicinity of R&D strongholds (if for 
no other reason, because they attract dynamic 
firms near them) have made local policymakers 
very eager to build the next silicon valley. This 
eagerness emerges even if their region/state has 
no important tradition and strength in the specific 
S&T field (neither did Silicon Valley, nor Finland). 
It has also made them very reluctant 
to forego this goal/dream, in favour of well-
established centres elsewhere, with long science 
and technology (S&T) traditions. It is easy to see 
why this would be viewed as the equivalent of 
Silicon Valley foregoing information technology 
because there was relevant S&T excellence in 
the northeast of the US, or Finland not pursuing 
mobile telephony ceding the field to traditional 
telecoms powerhouses in other countries.
The problems with increasingly concentrating 
funding on a small number of centres are non-
trivial. On the one hand, research support 
is already heavily concentrated in a limited 
number of institutions, and history matters in this 
context: past success propagates concentration of 
resources.
 
Moreover, reducing variety is not a desirable 
goal. Concentration and reductions in variety can 
undermine the potential for new innovations to 
emerge (Mollas-Gallart and Salter, 2002). Variety 
and redundancy open the door for new entrants 
into the system, and thus new competitors, which 
can guarantee incumbents will not sleep on their 
laurels. In science, these new entrants often sit on 
the margins of traditional disciplines and journals, 
and do not have stellar records; starving them of 
a modicum of resources that would allow them 
to tinker on and with the margins may do science 
a disservice in the medium to long run.
Software engineers, by way of example 
were often viewed as low-grade technicians by 
traditional electrical engineering departments, 
and they had to conduct their research in second-
tier universities. It was only through time and 
the rapid expansion of the software industry that 
their work was fully appreciated (Mollas-Gallart 
and Salter, 2002). This pattern has occurred 
repeatedly in the history of the sciences. Robert 
May (1998), the former Chief Scientific Advisor 
to the UK Government and Head of the UK 
Office of Science and Technology, suggested that 
in order to overcome the essential conservatism 
of institutions of science, it is necessary for 
research councils to promote diversity and 
“ambitious” research. Funding only the usual 
“excellent” recipients is not clever science policy 
in this regard – not to mention the monopolistic-
monopsonistic distortions it can generate.
One limitation of stellar-record-based 
concentration models is that they tend not 
to promote the kind of diversity that may be 
necessary to foster innovation, but rather lead 
to anti-competitive concentrations of sources 
of funding as well as of recipients of funds. As 
mentioned above one of the key characteristics 
of the US system of research is that there are a 
number of overlapping and competing funding-
sources of research. This competition among 
funding-sources creates opportunities for new 
entrants to win resources and enables new areas 
of research to emerge. In comparison to the US 
system of multiple and overlapping sources of 
finding, European researchers have fewer sources 
to access when they search for funding. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in KfG debates 
and also in the Barcelona workshop, welfare may 
depend on human capital availability, which in 
turn depends on research and on a region/state’s 
15
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plays different roles (including training); moreover, 
research and innovation interact in a variety of 
ways and the outputs of academic research go 
well beyond the generation of new knowledge 
as embodied in scientific papers. A key benefit 
of publicly funded research to innovation is the 
development of trained problem-solvers. 
Excluding under-performing organisations 
will reduce possibilities for contact between 
students and the research process, thus possibly 
restricting the supply of future researchers as well 
as problem-solvers. 
Given the importance of cumulative 
advantage in science, left to itself research funding 
tends to be highly concentrated in a small number 
of regions. Policy measures have been adopted 
to mitigate the weight of history in propagating 
such concentration. In the US, for instance, 
the National Science Foundation’s Office of 
Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive 
Research (EPSCoR)2 has been set up to support 
proposals from less favoured US States. The Small 
Business Innovation Research programme (SBIR)3 
also spreads research funding to many small 
firms, and has a counter-agglomeration impact. 
The problem faced by funding organisations 
is to determine a priori what will be excellent 
research. Stellar performance patterns are 
not necessarily excellent predictors of future 
research performance, especially in new areas, 
and especially as “incumbent” research groups 
become complacent (Mollas-Gallart and Salter, 
2002). Under hypothetical conditions of full 
information and certainty, one could reach an 
optimal solution applying standard resource 
allocation algorithms. However, as long as 
serendipitous discovery is part of science, it is 
very difficult for peer review panels to know when 
or where excellence will emerge (Mollas-Gallart 
2 http://www.nsf.gov/od/oia/programs/epscor/about.jsp
3 http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/sbirsttr_programs.htm
and Salter, 2002). The impossibility of identifying 
a priori successful research, and the monopolistic/
monopsonistic distortions that overconcentration 
can generate may justify pursuing multi-track 
policies, where by the handsome returns from a 
few success stories will more than compensate 
for the cost of those less successful undertakings 
(Mollas-Gallart and Salter, 2002).
Interestingly, as mentioned in KfG debates 
and also in the Barcelona workshop, even regions 
that are currently at the technological frontier 
may benefit in the long run from an approach 
which avoids further geographic agglomeration. 
By not being monopolists of innovation and 
monopsonists of R&D talent in a research area, 
regions can gain not only through competition, 
i.e. by avoiding the complacency associated with 
not having tough competitors, but also through 
more complex/diverse specialisation pattern, 
avoiding the single-crop, all-eggs-in-one-basket 
mega-specialisation in one area. This point can be 
seen in conjunction with another one, regarding 
coordination through central initiatives producing 
alignment of national and regional programmes in 
terms of specific priorities, calendars, instruments. 
These neat and disciplined alignments may be 
appropriate for scientific activities in “mature” 
fields/areas, but not necessarily for new path-
breaking R&D needs. The latter are marked by 
fast-paced change, high programme diversity, 
and unforeseen marriages across disciplines and 
technologies. In any case better coordination of 
R&D should be seen in conjunction with higher 
education structural reforms, and with countries 
opening up to competition, but at the same time, 
also locally investing in this process. 
This dual approach of opening-up and local 
investment is worth further analysis, and the 
resulting researcher flows would also be worth 
exploring. They should be multi-directional; 
unidirectional ones lead to brain-drain (with 
the all-too-common move to the US as the 
ultimate step in the brain-drain flows). Indeed, 
there is an analogous concern regarding the 
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(and monopsonists of researcher talent) within 
smaller enclaves (at the level of region or state). 
This should not be taken lightly. Avoiding large-
area monopolies does not mean condoning local 
ones. An antidote to local dinosaurs can be found 
in opening up competition in such local enclaves, 
while however taking care to have flows of human 
and other resources be bi-directional, and indeed 
multidirectional. After all once a researcher has 
left his home in Bulgaria to go to Germany or 
the UK, there is little to prevent the next logical 
step taking him where sirens sing loudest, and 
scientific/economic returns are portrayed endless, 
i.e. the US.
Regarding the logical conclusion of 
concentration, which nurtures monopolies, one 
may often ask why can’t we limit the number to a 
small manageable number of competing entities, 
say 5 or 10 or 15? First of all this generates 
oligopolistic behaviour, which has its own share 
of problems, but before opening that Pandora’s 
box, the following two crucial questions should 
be answered? How and who decides on what 
the magic number should be? And where should 
those lucky few be located? 
Furthermore, shutting to the door to the 
first runner-up(s) is hard to justify and politically 
unpalatable. To use a very graphic example of 
the “dual” of this problem – an example quite in 
tune with what we are witnessing in the ongoing 
economic crisis: shutting the door to runner-ups 
would be like shutting the door to some of the 
states close to bankruptcy. 
Before we move on to brief summaries 
of the papers that make up this volume it is 
worth reiterating a key “self-conscious” type of 
observation – i.e. the kind usually avoided: As 
long as policymakers are convinced -partly by 
the innovation-studies community’s persuasive 
arguments over the years- that S&T is one of 
the very few levers they have to try to turn their 
country onto a higher standard-of-living path, 
they will want to be among those striving for and 
in the most promising S&T fields.
Dominique Foray’s report defines and 
endeavours to operationalise the concept of “smart 
specialisation”. It is argued that specialisation 
can only occur in a large research and innovation 
area that allows for unrestricted competition. 
Foray predicts that the realisation of the European 
Research Area (ERA) will bring Europe closer 
to such a reality. Regions can then engage 
in an “entrepreneurial process” of matching 
local knowledge production to the “pertinent 
specialisations” of the region. Pertinence in this 
discovery process, it is argued, will be defined 
by the (largely exogenous) emergence of General 
Purpose Technologies (GPTs). Foray argues that 
while leader regions invest in the invention of 
a GPT, less advanced regions must invest in the 
“co-invention of applications”. Regions engaging 
in smart specialisation thus enjoy high returns 
as they enter a competition arena composed of 
a small number of players. Government policies 
have a role in providing appropriate incentives to 
entrepreneurs who are involved in the discovery 
of the right specialisation.
Phil Cooke examines existing indicators of 
national and regional specialisation indicators 
and finds that contemporary statistical tools offer 
little by way of resolute explanations. Drawing 
from a rich body of evidence in regional science, 
Cooke shows that innovation is more likely to 
occur in regions that make the best use of various 
types of proximity – including not only spatial, but 
also the sectoral type. Specifically, he posits that 
regional innovation rates and economic growth 
are positively associated with the presence of 
related variety, understood as the collocation 
of related industrial sectors, and knowledge 
spillovers such variety generates.
For Keith Smith, understanding the issue 
of specialisation in Europe requires – first of 
all – understanding the degree to which Europe 
exhibits differences in strategy, organisation 
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differences reflect fragmentation and duplication, 
which lessen the overall impact of national R&D 
strategies, or rather a healthy diversity? Answering 
these questions requires looking at disaggregated 
data across Europe. Different, imaginative, 
classifications of R&D data might be required in 
order to achieve this in a successful way (some 
are proposed by Smith), and would yield the 
added benefit of pointing the way forward for 
future classification and presentation of R&D data 
by statistical offices.
Andrea Bonaccorsi argues that the poor 
performance of European science in the 
last quarter of a century is one of the long-
term reasons behind the European loss of 
competitiveness. Bonaccorsi presents evidence 
indicating that the relative importance of a strong 
and dynamic science base for manufacturing 
services production has increased over time. 
Scientific leadership, it is argued, is important 
for economic activities that are very far from the 
technological frontier even if the relationship 
is indirect and unpredictable. Because of the 
indirect nature of that relationship, the current 
policy debate could be severely underestimating 
the importance of a strong science base. He uses 
a short case study on the careers of top computer 
scientists to show that the weak performance of 
the European IT industry can be associated with 
weaknesses at the scientific frontier. Bonaccorsi 
concludes with a discussion of the implications 
that these observations have for the design of 
appropriate institutional structures. 
Mark Harrison’s note, written six years 
ago in the context of a national debate on the 
concentration of university research funding 
in the UK, remains highly relevant. Harrison 
cautions that the evidence on the link between 
high-quality research and critical mass is weak 
and, drawing examples from the economic 
history of Soviet R&D, argues that policy-induced 
concentration in R&D is unproductive in the 
long-run. The brunt of his argument is based 
on the damaging effects brought about by the 
lack of competition and the associated perverse 
institutional incentive structures. Harrison takes 
the view that the ambivalence of policy makers 
between pluralism and concentration occurs 
in cycles. He hazards the prediction that his 
contemporary preoccupation with critical mass 
would be reversed in the following years. Recent 
events in the UK (Corbyn, 2008; Gil, 2009) 
suggest his prediction is well on course to be 
proven correct.
The paper by Antanas enys presents an 
overview of factors which account – in part – for 
Europe’s R&D deficit, viewed from the perspective 
of R&D specialisation. He proposes that a balance 
should be struck between having an economy that 
is too specialised (where greater progress in one 
area will be achieved to the expense of progress 
in another) or too diffused (which will lead to a 
decrease in activity in each separate area). This 
balance should take into account that Europe is 
oriented towards more traditional, low-risk and 
slow-growing, areas; lacks sufficient academic 
spending; does not involve businesses enough in 
R&D (as funders and performers); lags behind in 
service R&D expenditures and does not have a 
large enough ICT sector.
Anastasios Giannitsis attempts to 
delineate the interfaces between research 
specialisation, the economy and public policy. 
His report acknowledges that the phenomenon 
of specialisation is multidimensional and that 
policies intending to induce specific specialisation 
patterns carry risks as well as opportunities. On the 
one hand, opportunities include improvements 
in productivity, a first-mover’s advantage on 
emerging technologies as well as significant future 
challenges relating to energy, the environment 
and climate change. On the other hand, risks 
include reductions in competition, state failure 
(including the opportunity cost of not acting) and 
possible implications for intra-EU convergence. 
In an attempt to identify viable policy options, 
Giannitsis distinguishes between proactive and 
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combining the best elements of both. He sees 
value in opting for a flexible European Research 
Area, that combines a “research friendly ecology” 
with a “cluster specific environment” for specific 
research areas of importance. The author cautions 
that although very often specialisation patterns are 
path-dependent and therefore change is bound to 
be gradual, in the case of more radical technical 
changes path-dependency is not necessarily the 
case. He concludes that policies for strengthening 
R&D specialisation must include strategies for 
enhancing variety creation and selection and 
supporting “differentiation” elements against 
competitors, an effective functional coordination 
of research activities as well as timely adjustments 
to institutional structures and the provision of 
large-scale public goods.
Finally, Dimitrios Pontikakis, George 
Chorafakis and Dimitrios Kyriakou discuss some 
stylised observations about the potential benefits 
and pitfalls of specialisation, outline a sketch 
of the policy approaches currently on offer and 
make the case for strengthening the capacity of 
European research systems to shift resources to 
promising areas. They conclude with suggestions 
for further research that could enhance the 
currently lacking evidence base.
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Preamble4
This short report defines and endeavours 
to operationalise the concept of “smart 
specialisation” (SS) and, in this sense, is a 
continuation of the work of the “Knowledge for 
Growth” Expert Group (Foray and Van Ark, 2007)
First of all, the concept of SS is placed in 
perspective within the context of European policy 
on Research, Technology and Development, 
emphasising the fact that the SS option is in a 
way unique and essential for regions that wish “to 
stay in the game”, something which will prove 
increasingly difficult as construction of the ERA 
(European Research Area) progresses.
Then the basic characteristics of SS are 
defined:
•	 firstly,	 the creation of a large research and 
innovation area, allowing unrestricted 
competition is an essential condition for 
specialisation (as stated by Adam Smith : 
the degree of specialisation is a function of 
the size of the market) (Marimon and Graça 
Carvalho, 2008)
4 Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Marianne Kager, 
chief economist at the Bank of Austria and Teresa Patricio, 
member of the Secretariat of State for Science, Technology 
and Higher Education of the Government of Portugal, for 
agreeing to discuss examples of « smart specialisation » 
in their respective countries with me. My gratitude also 
goes to the members of the “Knowledge for Growth” 
Expert Group, especially Ramon Marimon, Georg Licht, 
Paul David, Reinhilde Veugelers, Philippe Aghion, André 
Sapir, Jacques Mairesse, Bronwyn Hall, Tassos Giannitsis 
and Commissioner Janezs Potocnik for the suggestions 
and arguments they contributed to this debate. Finally I 
greatly acknowledge comments and suggestions provided 
by the participants to the Barcelona Seminar on “Research 
specialisation in the EU” (30 June 2008).
•	 secondly,	 the	 search	 for	 SS	 does	 not	
involve a bureaucratic process (plan) or 
an exercise of foresight, ordered from a 
consulting firm. It concerns an essentially 
entrepreneurial process in which the 
new knowledge produced relates to the 
« pertinent specialisations » of the region. 
These « discoveries » have a very high social 
value since they are intended to guide the 
development of the region’s economy.
•	 thirdly, the specific properties of General 
Purpose Technologies or Tools (GPTs) define 
a framework to clarify the logics of SS for both 
regions that are at the technological frontier 
and those that are less advanced. While 
the leader regions invest in the invention 
of a GPT (biotechnology, information 
technology) or the combination of different 
GPTs (bioinformatics), followers must invest 
in the « co-invention of applications », that 
is development of the applications of a GPT 
in one or several important domains of the 
regional economy. These regions enter into 
a realistic and practicable competition logic, 
by defining a competition arena composed 
of a small number of players.
•	 Finally,	 there is a role for governmental 
policies, which, once again, is not that of 
bureaucratically selecting specialisations and 
then picking the winners. The role allotted to 
governments comprises four parts:
(i) Supplying incentives to (encourage) 
entrepreneurs who are involved in the 
discovery of the right specialisations ; the 
incentive framework is essential since as 
Understanding “Smart Specialisation”4
Dominique Foray
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland
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the knowledge produced is very high 
and entrepreneurs who make this kind 
of discovery are likely to capture only a 
negligible part of this social value.
(ii) Assessing the value of the identified 
specialisations
(iii) Identifying and supporting the 
investments that are complementary to 
the right specialisations (educational 
and training institutions for example) ; 
in the case of a region investing in the 
“co-invention of applications of a GPT”, 
these complementary investments also 
include the connection with the centres 
that produce and invent the GPT.
(iv) Cutting down investments which were 
supported ex ante as part of promotion 
of the search for the right specialisations, 
but turn out to be inappropriate ex post. 
European regions, R&D globalisation 
and ERA as solution
In what way are European regions ill prepared 
for globalisation?
The public research system in Europe 
remains fragmented and nationally based, 
limiting agglomeration processes and hampering 
the formation of world-class centres. This 
fragmentation has prevented the natural 
development of the hubs whose growth should be 
unrestrictedly nurtured by the best sources of the 
knowledge economy. In actual fact, with some 
rare exceptions, agglomeration processes operate 
within national systems and resource flows do 
not cross borders. Without this fragmentation, we 
could imagine liberated agglomeration dynamics 
leading to the constitution of truly competitive 
centres on the global level.
Furthermore, in Europe we observe a definite 
tendency in Europe for countries and regions to 
do the same thing and envisage their future in 
a similar fashion. Every European region prides 
itself on having its investment plan in information 
technology, biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
In most regions, decision-makers define priorities 
in a very unimaginative way. The problem is not 
a simple one and technology foresight exercises 
or critical technologies ordered here or there 
by administrations tend to produce the same 
ranking of priorities, without any consideration 
for the context and specific conditions of the 
“client” for whom the exercise is carried out. 
This lack of imagination and vision produces a 
uniformisation of the European knowledge base 
and a deterioration of what can constitute the 
originality and distinction of local knowledge 
bases. A probable consequence of this lack of 
originality is that large European companies 
are going to operate more and more as a global 
knowledge network and transfer their innovation 
activities outside their native country because the 
latter is now doing more or less the same thing 
as all the others (and certainly does it a little less 
well than the best of them) (Doz, 2005).
This nationally-based fragmentation and the 
uniformisation of priorities leave Europe with 
a collection of subcritical systems, all doing 
more or less the same thing, systems which are 
unattractive and thus cannot play in the arena 
of the world localisation tournament. Such a 
situation is obviously a source of inefficiency:
•	 economy	 of	 scale	 and	 spillover	 potentials	
are not fully realised
•	 economies	of	 agglomeration	 are	dissipated,	
resulting in a system made up of too many 
unattractive sites.
In fact, the logic of territorial attractivity is 
based on the scarcity of a very specific resource: 
the economies of agglomeration themselves. This 
rare resource is wasted as soon as too many sites 
are competing to capture the same resources.
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for example, can Europe manage to set up? No 
doubt fewer - far fewer - than 28 or 30 !
European Research Area as solution?
The European Research Area (ERA) can be 
analysed in the light of our remarks, that is to say, 
as an initiative aimed at freeing agglomeration 
processes (CEC, 2007) The general integration of 
national systems will allow resources to circulate 
unhindered and go where they will gain the most 
benefit from these external effects. Thus centres 
of excellence will be established to the advantage 
of some sites while subcritical structures, hitherto 
protected by national borders, will more or less 
disappear off the map.
This process can be expected to result in a 
better exploitation of the principal determinants 
of research productivity:
Economies of scale
Two sources of economy of scale remain 
under-exploited : the allocation of fixed research 
costs (large-scale equipment) over a larger 
number of programmes and projects and the 
aptitude to invest in more specialised skills and 
more sophisticated technologies as the system 
grows in size. Each « small» national system will 
manage to employ a few molecular biologists 
who are sufficiently non-specialised to be able 
to « do a bit of everything », which, on an 
aggregated level, leads to the formation of an 
army of average researchers. On the other hand, 
a more integrated system would be capable of 
employing the most highly specialised scientists, 
who would go where the appropriate equipment 
and programmes are developed, regardless of 
national borders.
Economies of variety and internal spillovers
The ERA must moreover facilitate the 
exploitation of economies of variety and 
maximisation of the internal spillovers that 
no longer depend on the size of the system 
but on the diversity of knowledge bases. The 
way in which generic knowledge can nurture 
numerous domains (economics of variety) and 
a research effort in one domain can generate 
knowledge that can be applied to other domains 
(spill-over) is determined by the diversity/
complementarity of knowledge bases and their 
integration into one single area. Are people 
aware that in the United States the National 
Science Foundation has developed a programme 
that transfers researchers specialised in clinical 
trials (university hospitals) to the educational 
sciences to apply experimental methods used 
in the medical field to the teaching field? A fine 
example of economics of variety that can only 
be exploited in a system sufficiently large and 
integrated to permit a supply and demand of 
very specific capacities to coincide and link up.
The necessity for smart specialisation 
The mechanisms at work in the ERA can 
be expected to further increase polarisation 
phenomena however: scientific densification 
for some regions, “desertification” for many 
others. Yet such a result would be politically 
unacceptable and inefficient from an economic 
point of view. It is therefore important not to 
turn the ERA into a mechanism of net transfer of 
resources to the most advanced regions. 
It therefore seems that there is only one 
means of reconciling unrestricted agglomeration 
processes aimed constituting these famous 
knowledge hubs that are competitive on a 
worldwide scale with a relatively balanced 
geographical distribution of research 
capacities throughout Europe : this means 
lies in the aptitude of regions and countries 
to “particularise themselves”, in other words 
develop an original strategic vision in terms 
of science and technology and implement the 
policies necessary to conform to it.
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have already stressed the lack of imagination 
in this domain above – the mechanisms 
implemented within the ERA framework will 
result in a “draining” of the greater part of the 
European territory, or otherwise they will have 
to be corrupted by the redistributive logics of 
cohesion policies in order to prevent this from 
occurring. If, on the other hand, each region 
succeeds in developing an original and unique 
knowledge base, the scenario becomes much 
more interesting. This is the notion of smart 
specialisation. 
Specialisation is thus a requirement 
associated with the construction of the ERA - but 
it will also be facilitated by the ERA. As stated by 
Marimon and de Graça Carvalho (2008) “smart 
specialisation is not achieved through a clever 
foresight-political process, but by letting ideas, 
innovations and researchers compete without 
barriers, in a large, open and fair field, as the ERA 
can be”. 
Anatomy of the smart specialisation process 
The recent report by the Lisbon Expert Group 
(LEG) clearly shows that even if countries are 
ready to assume their responsibility to honour 
the Lisbon objectives, particularly by increasing 
their research effort, they cruelly lack vision and 
strategy (Lisbon Expert Group, 2006). In short, 
they are prepared to make an effort but do not 
really know why, beyond the general rhetoric on 
the subject of research as growth factor.
Knowing on which knowledge base any 
particular region or country must build in order to 
define its growth strategy is a key question and at 
the same time a difficult one. It must be emphasized 
that answering this question should not lead to 
a bureaucratic logic of industrial planning but 
indeed to a research process of an entrepreneurial 
type, that is one in which entrepreneurs must 
play a central role. The decision-makers will 
limit their interventions to four aspects of the 
process : helping these entrepreneurs of a rather 
special type (see below); evaluating the value 
of the identified specialisations; identifying 
complementary investments (human capital) and 
facilitating the coordination mechanisms allowing 
a regional system to collectively switch over 
toward the selected specialisations; and pruning 
the investments which turn out to be inappropriate 
ex post but were supported ex ante as part of the 
search process.
Search for the right specialisations : an 
entrepreneurial process
Here we are evoking a particular learning 
process, which has until now not received very 
much attention from economists. This learning 
process consists of discovering the research 
and innovation domains in which a region can 
hope to excel. This learning process is primarily 
the responsibility of entrepreneurs who are best 
placed to discover the right specialisations. This 
really does involve a process of discovery since 
the production functions of the different types 
of innovation and invention are not common 
knowledge.
This activity poses a public policy problem. 
The discovery of pertinent specialisation domains 
has high social value since this knowledge is going 
to define the direction of company investments 
and research organisation projects. But the 
entrepreneur who makes this initial discovery 
will only be able to capture a very limited part of 
his investment’s social value since, by definition, 
other entrepreneurs will swiftly move into the 
identified domain. There is consequently a risk 
of not seeing enough entrepreneurs « invest » in 
this particular discovery process (Hausmann and 
Rodrik, 2002).
Insofar as the process of learning the 
right specialisations for a given region implies 
investment and the return on this investment 
cannot be completely appropriated by the person 
who makes it, we find ourselves confronted with 
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be resolved by resorting to intellectual property. 
The basic discovery concerns a field of research 
or type of innovation of which the region could 
become the leader. This type of discovery is not 
normally subject to legal protection, whatever its 
social return. Public policies thus have an essential 
role to play in encouraging entrepreneurs who 
invest in this particular discovery process and 
will not have the possibility of using the usual 
legal protection mechanisms to enable them to 
capture a large proportion of the social return on 
their investments. 
Evaluation of knowledge base 
The exercise carried out by the author for the 
Toulouse region and - in another context - for the 
Lake Geneva region (Lausanne and Geneva) is 
extremely illuminating (Mowery, 2002).
Confronted with the already existing 
knowledge base, or one that is under construction, 
experts and decision-makers must endeavour to 
answer the following questions:
•	 What	 is	 unique	 and	 original	 about	 my	
region's knowledge base ?
•	 Can	 it	 be	 developed	 by	 building	 on	
knowledge and know-how accumulated in 
the past? 
•	 Does	 this	 base	 offer	 sufficient	 innovation	
and spillover potential (in other words, 
does it hinge on the production of a so-
called "general purpose" technology or has 
it developed in an important application 
domain of a general purpose technology)?
•	 Is	 this	 base	 linked	 to	 markets	 with	 growth	
potential and/or important economic 
domains for the region?
•	 Is	 it	 difficult	 or	 easy	 for	 other	 countries	 to	
reproduce and imitate (particularly emerging 
countries)?
•	 Is	 it	 sufficiently	 broad	 (capable	 of	 giving	
rise to a diversified portfolio of connected 
activities, mutually strengthening each other 
thanks to synergies, economies of variety 
and spillovers) or too narrow, and therefore 
running a risk of dependency on one single 
domain and technological monoculture?
A correctly carried out particularisation 
process will thus reveal the future strategic 
domains for the region or country.
Complementary investments and coordination 
policy 
Adopting a strategic vision is a very important 
thing, and then having the capacity to set the 
system in motion so that the anticipations of the 
different economic agents coincide and converge 
towards this vision is another. All the ingredients 
of an innovation policy must then be mobilised 
so that public and private agents invest in a 
coordinated way in the identified domains. We 
know that in this respect supply policies directed 
toward the development of the knowledge 
infrastructure (basic science, high education 
and training, technology platform, large-scale 
programmes, technology transfer plan) must be 
completed by the provision of incentives to the 
private sector as well as demand policies (public 
purchasing policy, support of lead markets); 
public policy to support innovation has proven 
to be especially effective where funding for R&D 
was combined with complementary policies 
supporting the take-up of innovation). This 
concerted set of actions aims at bringing agents’ 
anticipations into alignment and successfully 
coordinate investment plans (Mowery, 2006) for 
the benefit of the development of a particular 
technology or a particular sector.
A key issue is, therefore, for the regional (or 
national) economy to be able to shift research and 
innovation capabilities to more productive use 
(one or a few number of selected fields) whenever 
possible. This ability is a critical determinant of 
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with respect to technologies and sectors. But 
departing from neutrality is always dangerous 
since it implies guessing future technological 
and market developments. So a central question 
is about “program design”: how to make these 
mission-oriented large programs less vulnerable 
to government failures, wrong choices, picking 
winners, market distortions.
Complementarities with competition policy 
is central as well as the presence of more than 
one funding agency with different but overlapping 
agenda. Also important is to avoid the pre-definition 
of technology architectures and design by central 
planning but rather to let the market discovering 
the best technologies; even if it is done under the 
logic of a mission-oriented policy. Such programs 
have to be designed also in order to foster entry by 
new firms in emerging industries; not only to help 
the large firms already in place.
Strategic initiatives are important but the 
design of the principles of resource allocation is 
critical as well.
The “joys” of smart specialisation in the ERA 
Any region that has managed to do all that 
is ready for the ERA! It will only be competing 
with a small number of other territories to attract 
and capture the specialised knowledge economy 
resources in its domain ; it will more easily reach 
the « tipping point » to turn the increasing returns 
in its favour as the critical size threshold is far lower 
; the resources produced by the region, thanks in 
particular to its higher education, professional 
training and research programmes, constitute 
“co-specialised assets” (Teece, 1986) – in other 
words the regions and their assets have a mutual 
need of one other – which accordingly reduces 
the risk of seeing these resources go elsewhere. 
(Recall the old maxim of the economics of 
development: “beware of investing in things that 
can move!”). They will more logically circulate 
among the small number of regions sharing the 
same specialisations.
The region around Loeben in Styria, Austria, 
whose innovation capacity was initially built in the 
19th century in the field of mining and metallurgical 
technologies, is a good example. Constructed 
around a highly reputed technical university, this 
capacity has produced certain key inventions 
in the sector, while renewing technologies and 
investing in new areas of application, based on 
sustained entrepreneurial activity.
Thus the particularisation of regional and/
or national knowledge bases will prevent the ERA 
from being turned into a “draining” mechanism of 
most European territories and will on the contrary 
encourage the emergence of a geographically 
distributed system of research capacities, whilst 
facilitating the emergence of a certain number of 
globally attractive and competitive knowledge hubs.
Opportunities for everyone: Cambridge 
and Andalusia
Smart specialisations provide strategies 
for everybody, not just for Cambridge, Orsay 
or Louvain! Certain regions are well placed to 
try their luck in the general purpose technology 
production domain (Cambridge in biotechnology, 
Louvain for information technologies, Grenoble 
for nanotechnologies). Many other regions are 
in a good position to develop the applications 
of these general purpose technologies in 
economic domains that are important for the 
region in question: biotechnology applied to the 
exploitation of maritime resources in Andalusia ; 
nanotechnology applied to the wine quality 
control, fishing, cheese and olive oil industries in 
Braga (Portugal). 
The rare properties of general purpose 
technologies 
Major innovations are of course the result 
of the invention of a GPT and of the ensuing 
successive technological generations but 
myriads of equally economically important 
innovations result from the “co-invention” of 
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in fact distinguished by its characteristics of 
horizontal propagation throughout the economy 
and the complementarity between invention and 
application development (Bresnahan, 2003). 
These complementarities are fundamental. 
Expressed in the words of the economist, the 
invention of the general technology extends the 
frontier of invention possibilities for the whole 
economy, while application development changes 
the production function of a particular sector. 
Application co-invention increases the size of 
the general technology market and improves the 
economic return on invention activities relating 
to it. There are therefore dynamic feedback 
loops in accordance with which inventions give 
rise to the co-invention of applications, which 
in their turn increase the return on subsequent 
inventions. When things evolve favourably, a 
long-term dynamic develops, consisting of large-
scale investments in research and innovation 
whose social and private marginal rates of return 
attain high levels. This dynamic may be spatially 
distributed between regions specialised in the 
basic inventions and regions investing in specific 
application domains.
Most productivity gains from information 
technologies in the most recent period thus result 
from application innovations in certain domains 
whereas these gains resulted from generic 
inventions during the preceding period. This 
goes to show that there are indeed strategies for 
everyone: some key regions will play a worldwide 
role in the production of these technologies, and 
this role will be all the more prominent since 
these regions will benefit from more powerful 
agglomeration effects. A great many other regions 
must become world leaders by developing their 
knowledge bases at the intersection between a 
GPT and an application domain (or several). 
These regions must however forge strong 
links with one or another of those regions in 
the first category that will supply the generic 
knowledge, so that the application co-invention 
processes are permanently revitalised by the 
generic invention dynamic. These connections 
are in theory facilitated by the existence of 
externalities between the two domains, but 
additional incentives are certainly also necessary.
Road map for regions setting their sights on 
smart specialisation 
Of course, the constraints are many and the 
journey along the road to smart specialisation 
is a perilous one for those regions wishing 
to undertake it and install an application co-
invention capacity, liable to act as economic 
growth engine. These regions must:
•	 succeed	 in	 particularising	 their	 knowledge	
base (see above);
•	 invest	 in	 the	 production	 of	 human	 capital	
whose composition and general level will be 
adapted to the domains of specialisation;
•	 develop	 research	 and	 innovation	 capacities	
and direct them towards the co-invention of 
applications in the selected domains;
•	 set	 up	 networks	 of	 cooperation	 and	
knowledge circulation with other regions 
sharing the same specialisations;
•	 create	 and	 consolidate	 also	 -	 and	 perhaps	
especially - knowledge circulation networks 
with the region that invents the general 
technology;
•	 and	 finally	 make	 sure	 that	 most	 of	 the	
benefits from innovations are captured by 
regional actors. The « innovate here, benefit 
elsewhere » syndrome particularly applies 
to the least well-placed regions. Consider 
for instance start-ups that are bought and 
relocated. It is thus advisable to scale down 
this syndrome by adopting an active policy 
for financing company growth for example.
The connection between the two categories 
of region is important; it imposes investments 
in knowledge circulation networks in order that 
generic knowledge plays a nurturing role for 
application co-invention while the latter has a 
retroactive effect on the main invention dynamic.
26
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 “
Sm
ar
t 
Sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n” Finally, it should be pointed out that 
the « smart specialisation » strategy does not 
necessarily offer any protection against the risks 
of collective inertia and inability to respond 
to the challenges of a radical innovation that 
threatens to render the capacities of a particular 
region obsolescent. We know that resource 
agglomeration and geographical co-localisation 
have many virtues, particularly when a new 
technological paradigm emerges (these are the 
external effects that we have already reviewed). 
However these collections of resources can 
also turn into "communities of inertia", in other 
words communities in which the persistence of 
behaviours, values and beliefs that had previously 
worked well predominates (Sull, 2001). Firms may 
even tend to respond to the new challenge by 
placing even more confidence in the organisation 
routines of the past, a phenomenon that Sull 
designated "active inertias" (Sull, 2001). As this 
author clearly demonstrates, tyre companies in 
the Akron region of the United States responded 
to the technological challenge posed by Michelin 
by striving to incrementally improve their own 
technology that had become obsolete and heavily 
investing in new production capacities without 
making any radical technological changes to 
them. Akron was wiped off the map. So smart 
specialisation does not necessarily provide any 
protection against obsolescence and inertia. 
Even Silicon Valley is probably not immune (The 
Economist, 2003)! However three mechanisms 
– i) emphasis placed on application domains, 
essential for the local economy (for example 
the exploitation of maritime resources), ii) a 
continuing investment policy in higher education 
aimed at an appropriate composition and level 
of human capital for innovation, creativity 
and entrepreneurial activity and iii) a strong 
connection with the regions that invent generic 
technologies – must allow us to protect ourselves 
against too much inertia and, in the course of 
time, manage the inevitable moments of creative 
destruction and renewal.
By way of conclusion
At the dawn of the ERA, most European 
regions do not seem ready to become part of a 
European area that is open and competitive in 
the areas of research and innovation. Too many 
regions in Europe opt to compete in the same 
worldwide or European tournament in the field 
of biotechnologies or information technologies. 
This sheep-like behaviour inevitably leads to a 
collection of subcritical systems and results in 
an unhealthy uniformisation of the European 
knowledge base. 
The ERA is obviously one step ahead 
however since regions will no longer be able to 
take refuge behind their national borders in order 
to somehow or other maintain an uncompetitive 
or even mediocre research system. The ERA is 
aiming to liberate agglomeration processes and 
facilitate the emergence of world centres that will 
be able to draw from the best sources, without 
obstacle or limit. This development must not 
however be synonymous with a “draining” of the 
greater part of the continent in the science and 
technology domain.
“Smart specialisation” is the only concept 
that provides an answer to the problem of how to 
reconcile polarisation and distribution. If correctly 
carried out by a large number of regions (see 
above), “smart specialisation” will gear down the 
ERA in a way, by creating numerous sub-areas of 
competition and regional polarisation. But these 
will no longer correspond to state borders; they 
will be based on the existence of separate areas 
of specialisation, selected by these regions.
The smart specialisation process has already 
begun in a great many regions and territories. The 
few examples given in this article certainly do 
not do justice to all the efforts made at regional 
or country level to identify what is original 
and unique about their respective knowledge 
bases. Innovation systems associated with these 
knowledge bases are being developed in liaison 
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economy of the region or country. They must 
also maintain close relationships with the central 
regions that invent the generic technologies.
What still remains to be done however is to 
provide this smart specialisation process with a 
solid theoretical interpretation to perhaps give 
it an even greater political impetus. What is 
essentially required to achieve this are a good 
understanding of the entrepreneurial dimension 
of smart specialisation and an appreciation of the 
importance of the complementarities between 
the invention of a generic technology and the co-
invention of applications that sustain it. We hope 
that this volume will help to contribute to this 
understanding. 
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Introduction
The complexities of where and why 
economic growth occurs nowadays are difficult 
to pin down, especially if using growth models 
that are not accomplished at dealing with the 
exigencies of the knowledge economy. Hence 
a first task is to seek to show how “knowledge 
economy” conventions create different and 
distinctive demands of people and places than 
the prominent, century-long and more, effects of 
industrialisation and what came to be called the 
“Industrial Age.” It is one of the surprises to many 
observers of the rise of globalised web-based 
communication technologies, that work and 
communities have not spread out ubiquitously as 
a result of information society and its attendant 
“footloose” locational potential for people and 
jobs. Rather, as globalisation has proceeded, 
regions have become more prominent economic 
governance actors than they were, because many 
have evolved science and technology-based (and 
creative) clusters requiring elements of localised 
policy support.
Thus in a knowledge economy, greater 
economic force exists than hitherto in innovation 
deriving from creative, scientific and technological 
knowledge, often generated in university rather 
than corporate laboratories. It is thus important to 
understand, for economic purposes, the varieties 
of knowledge-based clustering, most notably in 
ICT, biotechnology, and newer ones even more 
focused on addressing climate change, like 
“cleantech”, to pin down the rationale behind 
it (Burtis et al., 2004). There are very strong 
indications for biotechnology worldwide that 
clusters in geographical proximity to university 
labs rather than large firms’ intra-mural R&D, 
are the source of knowledge-based growth. In 
ICT there are cases of comparable lab-focused 
location for R&D but also of location near 
customers and suppliers, or even airports, (so-
called Marshallian “localisation” externalities) for 
more routine interactions. Of central importance 
in the analysis of this kind of clustering compared 
to say, the remarkably successful clustering that 
generates so many employment opportunities 
in traditional Italian luxury design industries or 
those that pioneered textile manufacturing in the 
Great Britain of Alfred Marshall (1916) is the role 
of innovation and the science and research base. 
Reinforcing proximity are opportunities to 
gain from “knowledge spillovers” from the talent 
available, the novelty and quality of the “research 
industry” in specific knowledge “hotspots” and 
the opportunities for “open science” and even 
“open innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003). These are 
often found in proximity in the form of clusters, 
many warranting a post-cluster “megacentre” 
or “platform” designation since they contain 
“related variety” sub-clusters that may have 
high lateral absorptive capacity, major public or 
non-profit facilities like universities, hospitals, 
research laboratories, and government research 
institutes as anchors as well as firms, the more 
common element in business clusters according 
to Porter (1998). Within them are numerous 
intermediaries that are masters of many kinds of 
knowledge from exploration to exploitation and 
in-between (March, 1991); analytic, synthetic 
and symbolic knowledge categories distinguish 
science, engineering and creative production; 
and at the cognitive level, tacit, codified and, as 
proposed elsewhere, something that frequently 
The Knowledge Economy, Spillovers, Proximity and 
Specialisation
Phil Cooke
Centre for Advanced Studies, Cardiff University, UK
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intermediates in-between that we term “complicit” 
knowledge (Cooke, 2005). In what follows we 
examine national and regional R&D and S&T 
specialisation. This is followed by a section 
on theoretical implications for contemporary 
regional specialisation and “related variety.” 
Evidence on EU S&T Specialisation at 
National Level
A region/country’s level of specialisation in a 
given field of science or technology is measured 
by comparing the world share of the region/
country in the particular field to the world share 
of the region/country for all fields combined (we 
refer to the “share of scientific publications” for 
scientific specialisation patterns, and to the “share 
of patents” for technological specialisation). The 
EU’s scientific and technological output appears to 
be more diversified than that of the US. Although 
this is a potentially rich resource in the medium 
and long term, additional efforts are required to 
ensure that activities are not too fragmented.
The EU countries show diversity with regard 
to their scientific capabilities. Among the most 
active publishing EU countries, Germany is strong 
in physics and astronomy but is less involved in 
agriculture and food science; the UK is not overly 
specialized in any field according to statistics 
in Figure 1 and is relatively under-specialised in 
chemistry, engineering sciences, and mathematics 
and statistics; France is specialised in mathematics 
and statistics as well as in physics and astronomy 
but is weak in agriculture and food science; finally, 
Italy shows under-specialisation in agriculture and 
food science and in biological sciences. With 
regard to the smaller (in terms of publications) EU 
countries such as Portugal and Slovakia, concerns 
may arise about the broad scope of their scientific 
efforts given the constraints imposed by their 
limited financial and human resources.
Regional Specialisation in EU
In Figure 2 we see the EU structured 
according to its S&T “meta-regions” normalised 
in relation to regional Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Methodologically the map is derived from 
factor and cluster analyses of numerous S&T 
indicators drawn from Eurostat databases.
Examples of the indicators selected are 
shown in Figure 2 but others include Tertiary 
Education, Business R&D and Share of Innovation 
Strategies. Of especial interest are, first, the 
Figure 1: EU S&T Specialisation, 2005
BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK
Agriculture and food science
Basic life sciencies
Biological sciences
Biomedical sciences and pharmacology
Clinical medicine and health sciences
Earth and environmental sciences
Chemistry
Engineering sciences
Mathematics and statistics
Physics and astronomy
Computer sciences
under-specialised specialised no specialisation
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 1 (29) Low GDP & Patenting
 2 (67) High Education, High GDP
 3 (35) High Education, Low GDP
 4 (23) High GDP Wear Center
 (Highest GDP & Patenting)
Regional Innovation Hierarchy
Source: Verspagen (2007)
presence of islands of relatively high performing 
regions in the Accession Countries. While these 
generally form a S&T meta-region of high tertiary 
education but low GDP, the Prague, Budapest 
and Gyor regions score relatively high on both. 
Second, (Finland data not available) the Nordic 
countries are the highest performing meta-region, 
especially (Sweden) in its peripheral regions 
where a “knowledgeable cities” factor is the 
most likely explanation. Finally, southern Europe 
performs weakly on these S&T indicators.
Figure 3 presents some macro-sectoral 
manufacturing breakdown of S&T indicators. Thus 
categories including high technology specialised, 
specialised biochemistry, higher and lower order 
Figure 3: Regional Clusters in the Old and New Europe
Regional Clusters in the Old and New Europe
Source: Verspagen (2007)
 Lower Order I (30)
 High-tech specialised (26)
 Higher Order (29)
 Biochem specialised (34)
 Lower Order II (11)
 Extreme outliers (3)
 Specialised non-Elechem (16)
 Specialised Biochem (15)
 Lower Order III (12)
 No patents (3)
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functions, absence of patenting activity, and so 
on. Frankly-speaking this analysis produces some 
counter-intuitive results. First Greece (and Cyprus) 
are not normally considered high technology 
specialised countries. This can be explained 
partly methodologically where, amongst the S&T 
industry sectors analysed in Verspagen (2007) the 
high-tech ones are more pronounced than any 
others. However this does not mean Greece is a 
high-tech economy, rather the reverse. Regions 
specialised in biochemical S&T are less counter-
intuitive (e.g. Northern England, west Norway, 
and Rhine valley). Also “no patents” occur, 
predictably in a few rural, east European regions.
Lineaments of Proximity in the 
Knowledge Economy
In recent years, a focus on sub-national 
(regional) analysis has emerged as there has 
been a spotlight upon science-based clusters, 
interactive innovation, and creative, tolerant 
and talented concentrations of politically 
desirable economic growth. This is associated 
with a corresponding eclipse of the notions of 
ubiquity (Maskell, et al., 1998) as conditions of 
digital connectivity and the death of distance 
(Cairncross, 1997) as its main effect, in favour 
of the idea of proximity as a powerful economic 
force. In well-rooted research on even traditional 
industrial districts in Italy, one senses a revitalised 
recognition and analysis of social capital, trust 
and interactivity – and a notion of economic 
community as key contributors to continued 
small firm economic buoyancy (Becattini, 2001). 
Indeed, such is the dynamism of these globalising 
agglomerations that many now host in their 
interstices, communities within communities, 
as thousands of Chinese entrepreneurs and 
workers alongside fewer but still substantial 
numbers of Islamics migrated into cities like 
Carpi, near Bologna and Prato, near Florence, in 
the early 2000s (Becattini and Dei Ottati, 2006). 
Foremost are agglomerative opportunities for 
tacit, complicit, codified, face-to-face and tactile 
contact, knowledge exchange and of course 
business. Such socio-economic “communities of 
practice” are also the ne plus ultra of, especially, 
modern science-based economic development 
(Brown and Duguid, 2001). 
Thus the death of distance and the end of 
geography were rumours much exaggerated 
upon the advent of innovative, knowledge-based 
clusters (Morgan, 2004). However, interestingly, 
proximity, the literal meaning of which includes 
nearness, closeness, contiguity, and propinquity, 
all with traditionally geographical connotations, 
has evolved elaborated and geographically 
unconfined meanings, involving nearness in 
context, domain and even opinion. Thus digital 
chat-rooms are quite neighbourly places in 
virtual space. A multinational company displays 
characteristics of organisational proximity in 
all its global operations because of its common 
rules, conventions and resources, from job-titles 
to the commonalities of its intranet. Zeller (2004) 
in an interesting article tracing the dependence of 
Swiss “big pharma” on innovative biotechnology 
clusters elsewhere, lists, as well as geographical 
proximity, the following “virtual” proximities: 
institutional (e.g. national laws); cultural (e.g. 
communities of practice); relational (e.g. social 
capital); technological (e.g. Linux software users); 
virtual (e.g. a multinational); internal and external 
(e.g. firm supply chain management). Actually few 
feature prominently in empirical analyses such as 
the one he conducts and those that do are usually 
less important in explaining locational behaviour 
these days than the core idea of geographical 
proximity. Thus pharmaceuticals firms open R&D 
“listening posts” or acquire incumbent firms 
capable of quarrying American biotechnology 
clusters. This is a strategy to re-balance the 
knowledge asymmetries that have arisen as 
university centres of excellence and DBFs have 
outperformed “big pharma,” resulting in some re-
establishing domestic R&D headquarters abroad 
in the San Diego and Cambridge, Massachusetts 
biotechnology “megacentres” (Cooke, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the contemporary elaboration of 
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longer restricted to expressly spatial “nearness in 
place” meaning. Thus Zeller (2004) performed a 
useful service in this sense5.
Nevertheless, it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that much contemporary knowledge 
economy development tends to become 
increasingly city-focused. There is little yet that 
engages rurality with innovative clustering, though 
the rise of “cleantech” such as biofuels is beginning 
to change that (Cooke, 2008). The city, and even 
more so, metropolitan context has traditionally 
been the most powerful spatial determinant of 
growth, by and large. Now in the knowledge 
economy, its force is geared up, reinforcing 
geographical proximity as a vehicle for achieving 
economic success worldwide. While the “death of 
distance” was wrong, especially in its presumption 
of global “flattening”, nevertheless “knowledge 
economies” exist and evolve as nodes in global 
knowledge connected by globally networked 
information flows. This rests on the observation that 
globalisation actually proceeds through varieties of 
networks linking nodes of economic power, mainly 
cities, their knowledge institutions, governance 
mechanisms and firms. What the economist’s 
“spaceless playground” perspective misunderstood 
until Krugman (1995) was that such nodes would 
be the result of increasing returns to urban 
agglomeration (Sternberg and Litzenberger, 2004). 
By and large this has meant increasing 
returns derived from varieties of spillovers, 
especially knowledge spillovers, that tend to 
concentrate in cities, and elsewhere in other 
“knowledgeable cities” such as university or 
research towns. This is true for North American, 
Asian and European cities for which the required 
analysis has been performed. Clearly, such a wide 
array of city settings means the growth process 
is by no means identical in all cases. Moreover, 
5 A further theoretical analysis of the relations between 
innovation capability and varieties of proximity is presented 
in Boschma, R. (2005) Proximity and innovation: a critical 
assessment, Regional Studies, 39, 61-74
the competitiveness of cities often accompanies 
social polarisation. However, this is also a by-
product of growth where in-migrants are attracted 
because of perceived economic opportunities 
absent in their location of origin. 
Spillovers, Innovation & Growth
An emergent pattern in the contemporary 
variety of proximities is that proximity to 
knowledge spillovers is nowadays crucial to city 
growth from the exploitation through innovation of 
research knowledge. This harks back to the initial 
contention of Glaeser et al. (1992) that human 
capital and scarce skills are significant factors in a 
city’s capability to retain and augment its economic 
growth. This is thus something of a progenitor of 
Florida’s (2002) talent-led analysis of US city growth 
in the contemporary era. However, much of the finer 
detail of variations within growth trajectories is lost 
in these analyses, not least because of definitional, 
and even unit of data analysis complexities. 
One interesting differentiation first hypothesised 
from a static analysis of major concentrations of 
knowledge economy sectoral activities, derived 
from EU and other city and region level data on 
high technology manufacturing and knowledge-
intensive business services (KIBS), was that major 
cities, sometimes also capital cities, accreted 
much of the KIBS employment. Contrariwise, 
more specialist satellite cities concentrated high 
technology manufacturing employment to a greater 
extent. Live instances of that modern urbanisation 
process would include, for example, Cambridge 
and numerous lesser high-tech satellites of Boston 
such as Waltham, Worcester, Woburn and Andover; 
San Francisco vis à vis many such places in Silicon 
Valley, London in relation to Cambridge, Oxford 
and the Thames Valley; Stockholm and Uppsala; 
Helsinki and Espoo; and Copenhagen in cross-
border relationship to Lund, the so-called Medicon 
Valley, traversed by the Øresund bridge. These 
“cumulative causation” and “spatial backwash” 
effects were predicted long ago by Myrdal (1957) 
and Hirschman (1958)
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This suggests that in countries where the 
main financial centre is not the capital city the 
former will exert the stronger proximity effect 
but that where, as in the UK and, for example, 
Austria, the capital is also the leading financial 
services centre, a strong spatial monopoly (or 
more accurately quasi-monopoly) proximity 
effect is exerted (Cooke et al, 2007). This is the 
classic result modelled by Krugman (1995) in 
applying increasing returns to scale theory, 
under conditions of imperfect knowledge, to 
two hypothetically competing candidate cities 
with the consequence that one always ended 
up monopolising space. Contemporary city 
growth theory places knowledge spillovers from 
(geographical) proximity at the forefront of the 
explanation for these observed tendencies.
To repeat, this is not to say that geographical 
proximity determines economic activity to an 
overwhelming degree. If anything, the implications 
of what has been concluded here is that the defining 
feature of knowledge spillovers from geographical 
proximity is qualitative and quantitative in 
equal measure. That is, a firm, let us say, located 
proximately and actively in relation to multiple and 
varied sources of high grade intelligence, creativity 
and connectivity is in principle at an advantage 
compared to a competitor who is not. However, 
connectivity to other appropriate knowledge 
nodes elsewhere in the relevant global knowledge 
networks is likely to be quantitatively less intensive 
albeit of qualitative equivalence or even superiority. 
In their discussion of precisely this geographically 
proximate as against virtually proximate relationship 
Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) argued for the 
superiority of geographical proximity along the 
following lines. Key processes by which dynamic 
proximity capabilities are expressed interactively 
in research or exploration knowledge transfer, 
and commercialisation or exploitation knowledge 
transfer include the following:
•	 There	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 "channels"	
(open) and "pipelines" (closed). The former 
offer more opportunity for knowledge 
capability enhancement since they are more 
"leaky" and "irrigate" more geographically 
proximately. Pipelines offer more confidential, 
contractual means of proprietary knowledge 
transfer. This may occur locally or over great 
geographical distances based on contractual 
agreements. These are less "leaky" because 
they are closed rather than open.
•	 In	high-tech	fields,	 research	centres	may	be	
a magnet for firms because they operate an 
"open science" policy, promising spillover 
innovation opportunities. These are possible 
sources of productivity improvement, greater 
firm competitiveness, accordingly proximate, 
localised economic growth.
•	 Such	 open	 science	 conventions	 influence	
inter-firm innovation network interactions. 
Although researchers may not remain the 
main intermediaries for long as successful 
firms grow through patenting and 
commercialisation, they experience greater 
gains through the combination of proximity 
and conventions, than through either 
proximity alone or conventions alone. 
These propositions each receive strong 
support from statistical analyses of research 
and patenting practices in the Boston regional 
biotechnology cluster. Thus:
"Transparent modes of information transfer 
will trump more opaque or sealed mechanisms 
when a significant proportion of participants 
exhibit limited concern with policing the 
accessibility of network pipelines closed conduits 
offer reliable and excludable information transfer 
at the cost of fixity, and thus are more appropriate 
to a stable environment. In contrast, permeable 
channels rich in spillovers are responsive and 
may be more suitable for variable environments. 
In a stable world, or one where change is largely 
incremental, such channels represent excess 
capacity" (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004)
Finally, though, leaky channels rather than 
closed pipelines also represent an opportunity 
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nsFigure 4: Knowledge Capabilities and Economic Geography: A Theoretical Framework
Asymmetric Knowledge 
 Endowment
Regional Knowledge Domains 
(e.g. Epistemic Communities) 
Increasing 
Returns (to Variety)
Regional Knowledge 
Capabilities
Spatial Quasi-Monopolies 
(e.g. Clusters)
Open Innovation
(Raises Outsourcing)
Related Variety
 (Raises Absorptive Capacity)
for unscrupulous convention-breakers to sow 
misinformation among competitors. However, 
the strength of the "open science" convention 
means that so long as research institutes remain 
a presence, as in science-driven contexts they 
often do, such "negative social capital" practices 
are punishable by exclusion from interaction, 
reputational degrading or even, at the extreme, 
convention shift, in rare occurrences, towards 
more confidentiality agreements and spillover-
limiting "pipeline" legal contracts. We noted in 
the introduction how open science conventions 
attract, in further evolutionary rounds, "open 
innovation" to such knowledgeable clusters 
when it might otherwise be assumed openness 
should mean knowledge advantage erosion. But 
likely gains are perceived to outweigh losses 
by customers taking the plunge. This is a major 
factor in proximity-based economic growth since 
knowledge supplier firms garner a substantial 
share of their income from, especially, R&D 
outsourcing by larger customer firms. 
A Generalised Theoretical Framework: 
Economic Growth and Related Variety 
In this section, it is underlined how 
knowledge hegemony has shifted to universities 
and the cohorts of science-based firms that often 
co-locate with those that are “ahead of the curve” 
in industries like ICT, cleantech, nanotech and 
biosciences. In the course of this account, a 
possibly new theoretical framework for explaining 
spatial industry organisational shifts has to be 
essayed. It is evolutionary in origin, interested 
in the economics of search and selection 
practices of firms in contexts where variety 
acts as “evolutionary fuel” in Hodgson’s vivid 
phraseology (Hodgson, 1993). By evolutionary 
fuel is meant iterative, trial-and-error interactive 
feedback from experimentation by actors to 
survive and prosper economically. The greater the 
variety, the greater the opportunity for innovation 
arising from interactions with other actors. 
It has been shown empirically that 
opportunities for the swiftest innovation occur 
in conditions of proximate and related variety 
because of knowledge spillovers and high lateral 
absorptive capacity (Boschma, 2005). Cities are 
one variant of this, but because their variety can 
be fragmentary and only partly related, they 
are less fruitful than settings with only related 
variety (e.g. clusters or groups of related clusters, 
a good example being KU Leuven’s (catholic 
university Leuven) six ICT, bioscience and agro-
food clusters, employing 20,000; Hinoul, 2005). 
Hence this new perspective settles at the apex of 
a conceptual triangle between Jacobs (1969) who 
advocated sectoral diversification and Glaeser 
et al. (1992) specialisation as key wellsprings of 
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innovative growth through spillovers of various 
kinds. It is post-sectoral, recognising innovative 
growth to be facilitated through knowledge or 
technology platforms characterised by openness 
of knowledge flows. For example, a location 
specialising in leading edge research in sensors 
finds numerous applications of such technology 
in many related yet extensive fields where 
absorptive capacity is high. 
Understanding of technological efficacy 
is transferable with greater facility among 
“communities of practice” with low internal 
“cognitive dissonance” between industries. A 
priori biotechnology is the exemplar of this mode 
of industry organisation, but more as pioneer than 
offshoot now that the model of “open innovation” 
building on “open science” norms is emulated 
widely, from “open systems architectures” of 
various kinds to “open source” software (Owen-
Smith and Powell, 2004). The point here is that 
“open science” norms among scientists operate 
informally through normal “channels” even if 
“formally” confidentiality agreements exist with 
clients. This rather under mines Zucker et al.’s 
(1998) over-legalised interpretation of contracts 
that cross the academic and entrepreneurial 
interface. As Chesbrough (2003) notes clients 
know this – complicitly - in the knowledge also 
that they will themselves receive returns from 
localised knowledge spillovers in the cluster. Not 
all of this openness is geographically proximate, 
distant networks play a strategic part, and 
cognitive and relational proximities come into 
play as Boschma (2005) stresses.
Nevertheless, the implications of related 
variety as witnessed in the demise of the generic 
corporate R&D model compared to the varietal 
choice model found in the rich mix of research 
centres and niche firms in, for example a major 
biotechnology cluster, is testimony to the attractions 
to customers of the latter over the former model. 
These may be measured in terms of capabilities 
ranging from those relevant to exploration, 
examination or exploitation knowledge (Cooke, 
2007). Hence, there are grounds for advancing 
a theoretical framework that links together these 
new elements and highlights the role of varieties of 
knowledge in contributing a testable explanation 
of regional developmental asymmetries. The key 
elements are presented in Figure 4 above, and 
discussed subsequently. We start from the centre 
of the diagram, denoting a region in which a 
mix of widely in-demand knowledge capabilities 
evolves. Connecting to north-west in the diagram, 
and compared to other regions, this expresses its 
asymmetric knowledge endowment from a variety 
of knowledge organisations and institutions (Akerlof, 
1970). Exploration knowledge organisations, such 
as research institutes, knowledge networks among 
individuals (e.g. “lunar societies”; Uglow, 2003) 
and knowledge leadership figures (e.g. possible 
future Nobel laureates) co-exist with examination 
knowledge equivalents for standard-setting, 
trialling, testing and patenting, and exploitation 
knowledge bodies such as entrepreneurs, investors 
and related professional talent. The evolutionary 
fuel is supplied (linking westward in Figure 4) 
by the attraction of a variety of imitative and 
innovative talent to the region, a Schumpeterian 
“swarming” realising increasing returns to related 
variety (south-eastward diagrammatic connection) 
where innovation may move swiftly through 
various parts of the innovation “platform”. Related 
variety nourishes absorptive capacity because 
cognitive distance between platform sub-fields is 
low (think of “general purpose innovations”, after 
Helpman, 1998).
Moving north-east in Figure 4, these 
processes result in the presence of regional 
“knowledge domains.” The dictionary definition 
of “knowledge domain” is a region or realm 
with a distinctive knowledge base, common 
principles, rules and procedures, and a specific 
semantic discourse. This naturally fits well with 
the concept of the epistemic community with its 
own professional discourse and interests. Such 
monopolistic features are frequently characteristic 
of, for example, clusters that in regional terms 
may display related variety (e.g. varieties of 
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Emilia-Romagna in Italy in a spectrum from Ferrari 
cars and Ducati motor cycles (both Modena) to 
Sasib in packaging machinery (Bologna) and 
drgSystems machine tools in Piacenza; Harrison, 
1994). These and other clusters have spatial quasi-
monopolistic or “club” characteristics, exerting 
exclusion and inclusion mechanisms to aspirant 
“members” consequent upon their knowledge 
value to the club. If such industries operated as 
markets rather than knowledge quasi-monopolies 
it is difficult to see why spatial “swarming” 
would occur. But high technology firms at least 
are willing to pay super-rents of 100% to locate 
in clusters – even when they are professed non-
collaborators, to access anticipated localised 
knowledge spillovers (Cooke, 2007). Finally, to 
the south-west of Figure 4, it is precisely such 
localised knowledge spillovers that induce what 
Chesbrough (2003) calls “open innovation” 
whereby large firms outsource their R&D to 
purchase “pipeline” knowledge, and access 
via “channels” regional knowledge capabilities 
(Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). These processes 
interact in complex, non-linear ways displayed 
graphically in Figure 4, to explain regional 
knowledge asymmetries. Variations in the market 
value of regional knowledge combinations also 
contribute significantly to associated regional 
income disparities (Boschma and Frenken, 2003). 
Being an evolutionary growth process, successive 
increasing returns may be triggered from any 
point within or, of course, beyond the confines 
of Figure 4.
Conclusions
With respect to other sectors, perhaps less 
work has been conducted than in the economics 
of biosciences though “open innovation” and 
varieties of “outsourcing” research seldom focus 
on biotechnology as such. ICT, aerospace, even 
“consumer products” as studied by Chesbrough 
(2003) point to the knowledge quest having 
brought major reductions in large corporate intra-
mural R&D. There is of course a large question 
over the validity, reliability and even meaning of 
such an antediluvian notion as “sector”. Here is 
unfortunately not the place to delve into the lethal 
critique of the notion due to space limitations. 
However three criticisms can briefly be offered. 
First, the sector notion is a statistician’s artefact 
that is an increasingly misleading representation 
of reality. Second, sector classifications are little 
changed since their nineteenth century origins 
to enable identification of such activities as 
biotechnology, nanotechnology or “cleantech”. 
Figure 5: Technology Convergence in Cleantech
Clean
Energy Cleaner 
Production
Clean 
Water
Advanced Materials & Nanotechnology (e.g. catalysts and membranes)
Information Technology & Internet (e.g. advanced meters and sensors)
Biotech "CleanBio" (e.g. biopolymers and biofuels)
CONVERGENCE CONVERGENCE
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Third, as we have seen technological 
innovation increasingly progresses by means of 
the evolution of “platforms” that take spillover 
advantages, combine many technologies that 
are, in increasing numbers of cases, adaptable 
across first, related variety, later even more 
diverse industrial and technological applications, 
as a moment’s reflection upon the technology 
platform built around “cleantech” (Figure 5), let 
alone software or genetics makes clear.
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Introduction
Although Research and Technology 
Development (RTD) is only one part of the overall 
investments that are necessary for innovation, it is 
nevertheless a central element of any innovation 
strategy. Moreover it is an element in which 
government policy plays an important role: public 
investment in RTD is a significant component 
of overall RTD and knowledge creation in the 
European economies. A big question is the extent 
to which RTD policies should focus on existing 
and potential specialisations at the national level, 
and what this implies for EU policy.
Convergence and diversity
One of the primary objectives of the 
European Union is the promotion of a process 
of convergence in real incomes and living 
standards across the countries and regions of the 
Union. To a large extent, policies for achieving 
this have been seen in terms of establishing 
common frameworks for economic behaviour. 
These include most importantly the completion 
of the internal market, common regulatory and 
procurement frameworks, and the common 
currency. In some cases convergence is not only 
an intended outcome of these actions, it is seen 
as a precondition: entry into the monetary union, 
for example, involved convergence in some key 
macroeconomic ratios, such as debt to GDP, 
deficits to GDP, inflation rates and so on.
How does innovation and technological 
capability fit into this picture? If countries and 
regions in Europe are to converge as a result of 
integration, then they must do so on the basis 
of economic growth paths which have quite 
different starting points, if only in terms of initial 
differences in productivity, real incomes and 
so on. What is involved in growing towards 
convergence? It is widely recognised that 
economic growth rests - in complex ways - 
on capabilities with respect to organisational 
and technological innovation: all theories of 
economic growth, from whatever conceptual 
starting point, assign an overwhelming 
importance to technological change in particular 
in the growth process. It seems reasonable to 
suggest, therefore, that improving the growth 
performance of lower-income countries and 
less favoured regions involves upgrading the 
technological capabilities and innovation 
performance of the areas in question. 
But does this mean that convergence 
and integration are likely to rest on common 
technological capabilities? Does convergence 
- meaning similarities in terms of economic 
outcomes - imply similarity in terms of areas of 
technological knowledge, skill and competence, 
and in the investment processes which are 
necessary to develop such competence? From a 
policy perspective, to what extent does the process 
of European integration lead to convergence in 
policies with respect to RTD and innovation, and 
hence to the possible emergence of a “European 
system” of innovation based on commonalities 
in policy objectives and practices? There are 
important questions to be asked concerning 
whether Europe is involved in a coherent and 
diversified pattern of RTD. Most of the questions 
depend for their answers on an understanding of 
specialisation.
Specialisation and Europe’s R&D performance: A note
Keith Smith
University of Tasmania, Australia
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RTD specialisation
Central to the development of the Lisbon 
Agenda, in many of the relevant policy 
documents, is the idea that the overall publicly-
supported European RTD effort is fragmented 
and incoherent. This claim suggests replication 
and duplication of effort in some areas, but it 
also implies that there are problems of scale: 
because the national efforts are divided, there are 
difficulties in reaching critical mass, and therefore 
sub-optimal scale at the level of particular 
technological areas of fields of science.
The broad issue concerns the interpretation 
of differences in RTD efforts across Europe. Do 
these reflect fragmentation and duplication, 
or do they on the contrary represent a healthy 
diversity? From an evolutionary point of view, 
diversity – which in this case means different 
compositions of RTD, different organisational 
forms, and different research trajectories - is a key 
attribute of adaptability to change. In research 
generally, it is often fruitful to have multiple paths 
of investigation. Is this how European differences 
should be interpreted, or do we by contrast in 
fact have overlapping efforts, without genuine 
diversity? 
Clarifying such questions is important 
to the discussion of scale issues in European 
RTD. Here the issues concern not just the level 
of RTD in Europe, but rather its composition 
and organisation both at the aggregate level 
and within the Member States. The latter are of 
course responsible for most of Europe’s publicly 
funded RTD. Improving coherence is therefore 
very much a matter of enhancing coordination 
mechanisms across the diverse RTD systems of 
Europe, which in turn can only rest on a far more 
detailed knowledge of what is actually occurring 
in European RTD. Some broad issues for the 
implementation of ERA include:
•	 To what extent are there real differences 
or similarities in strategy, organisation and 
outcome (in term of actual performance of 
RTD) across Member States and regions?
•	 To what extent do such differences represent 
diverse paths (perhaps appropriate to 
differing regional or national conditions) or, 
by contrast, replication or duplication of 
priorities which lessen the overall European 
impact of national strategies?
To get a useful picture of evolution and 
trends in European RTD which might answer 
such questions, we need to go beyond general 
statements of strategy or statements of priorities 
into the detail of programme objectives, fields of 
research, and application areas, as well as into 
the details of research performance across large 
firms, government organisations and universities 
in Europe. 
This area is so closely related to the broad 
objectives of the Lisbon strategy, that it is a central 
challenge for the ERAWATCH project6. In line 
with this, evolution and trends in RTD are already 
being taken into account within ERAWATCH7. 
Measuring specialisation: methods and 
indicators
The background to any analysis of 
specialisation is the claim (made in several of 
the Lisbon/ERA documents) that the EU has too 
much duplication of effort, with everyone doing 
the same thing but a below critical mass. Behind 
this is the implicit idea that EU countries are all 
engaged in R&D replication/duplication. Is this 
true? Do we have duplication in the EU, or is there 
some kind of diversity? If there is diversity, then 
we would expect to see greater specialisation. 
 
6 http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/
7 Editors’ note: See for instance the national specialisation 
profiles provided by the ERAWATCH Intelligence 
Service: http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.
cfm?fuseaction=intService.rdSpecialisation
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specialisation, and technological specialisation 
as measured with patents, bibliometrics etc. 
But what about R&D? The big problem is that 
we have not explored data classified by socio-
economic objectives, and fields of research, at 
levels of disaggregation that enable us to say with 
any confidence that there is or is not any real 
specialisation (or conversely duplication) of R&D 
efforts across the EU. 
 
This suggests that it is important to focus 
on the issue of looking at R&D data in the most 
disaggregated way across the member states. We 
usually look at R&D in terms of sources of funding 
and sectors of performance. But it is also classified 
according to fields of research, socio-economic 
objectives (SEOs), types of research etc. 
 
What can be said about specialisation using 
existing Eurostat or OECD data on SEOs and Fields 
of Research? Not much is the answer, because 
the data is available at best at 2-digit level. This 
general problem could the theme of research on 
specialisation for the ERAWATCH project. Part 
of the project could focus on existing results and 
methods for looking at specialisation. A big part 
could discuss how we might get a better picture 
of R&D specialisation by using the different 
classifications of R&D data in a more imaginative 
way. This could include looking across countries 
with existing R&D data, then asking which 
countries have better data than others, and then 
doing specific country studies where the data is 
good. Where data is classified by all fields at 4 to 6 
digit level, then it is possible to get a good picture of 
specialisation. Then case studies can follow up on 
the data part of the exercise by trying to say what is 
actually happening in R&D efforts at country level. 
A related objective could be about the statistical 
problems involved in trying to get a picture of 
R&D specialisation, making recommendations 
for statistical offices about classification and 
presentation of the data they collect. 
R&D Data characteristics
What are the specific characteristics of 
the R&D data that need to be explored? R&D 
is normally financed by four broad “sources of 
funding”, and is carried out across four broad 
“sectors of performance”. The primary funding 
sources are: 
•	 The	business	sector
•	 Government
•	 Private	non-profit	 sources	 (such	 as	 charities	
or foundations)
•	 Overseas	funding
Each of these funding sources provides a 
flow of finance which is usually spent across four 
sectors of performance, which are:
•	 The	business	sector	
•	 Government	(including	organisations	such	as	
ministries, R&D labs and research institutes
•	 The	higher	education	sector	
•	 Private	 non-profit	 foundations	 (including	 a	
wide range of non-profit research institutes)
The basic sources of potential data are 
national R&D surveys. Among the advanced 
economies, some countries have more or less 
unique features in their R&D surveys that permit 
a detailed understanding of the structure of 
R&D performance. This is because, as well as 
collecting data on sources of funding and sectors 
of performance, they also provide four other types 
of breakdown of R&D expenditure. In the first 
place, the business sector data is broken down by 
performance by the industry which is performing 
research. This can, in principle, be done at fine 
levels of details.
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For all sectors, there are three further ways 
of classifying R&D expenditure and personnel 
resources. These are:
•	 by	 socio-economic	 objective	 (such	 as	
economic development, defence, health, 
environment etc)
•	 by	 type	 of	 research	 (that	 is,	 pure	 basic	
research, strategic basic research, applied 
research or experimental development)
•	 by	 field	 of	 research	 (meaning	 the	 specific	
area in which new knowledge is sought, such 
as molecular biology, applied mathematics, 
electronic engineering and so on)
It is possible to explore these categories 
down to very fine levels of detail, thus generating 
an understanding of the real priorities and 
specialisations of the European system. The 
problem for the future is to focus on total flows of 
funding and the specific uses to which financial 
resources are directed, and the objectives and 
scientific fields that are involved, rather than just 
looking at total amounts of funding and aggregate 
R&D intensities. This can potentially be done for 
all major R&D performing sectors. 
Policy Priorities
Specialisation does not necessarily have to 
be mapped in statistical terms. The qualitative 
evidence from ERAWATCH is also highly relevant. 
Turning to priorities, do EU Member States show 
commonalities in terms of explicit research 
priorities or do the efforts reflect specialisation? 
The ERAWATCH database suggests that at a 
general level there is a set of core science-
technology priorities that are common across 
many countries: ICT, biotechnology (especially 
biopharmaceuticals), and nano-sciences all feature 
strongly as priority fields across the EU. However 
at the level of detail currently available it is not 
possible to identify the extent to which there are 
overlaps or commonalities in the specific research 
programmes undertaken in these fields. There 
are some signs of emerging scepticism about the 
priority fields (that are of course common across 
a much wider spectrum of countries than simply 
the EU). In Finland, “present RTDI policies have 
to be seen against the background of dissipating 
ICT euphoria … and commercial difficulties of 
biotechnology companies”. However Finnish 
nanotechnology investment is increasing, with 
about 40 research groups active. Both Germany 
and the UK have strong medically oriented biotech 
programmes, with priorities in cardiovascular 
diseases, cancer, neural problems and (in 
Germany) genetic factors in environmentally-
caused disease. Some smaller countries have 
strong biotech programmes – Cyprus, for example, 
has a large biotech priority area, as does Portugal 
(with links to health objectives). 
Behind these broad commonalities there is 
apparent diversity across countries in a wide range 
of country-specific research fields. Germany, for 
example, has major programmes on transport and 
mobility, focusing on sustainability, low emissions 
traffic, railways, and traffic management in 
urban areas. The transport emphasis is shared 
in Austria. These programmes clearly relate to, 
and to some extent underpin, strong German 
industrial specialisation in vehicles, but also 
in high speed rail. German “lead projects” that 
relate to prospective technology fields include 
nutrition, food processes, and mobility, as well as 
more apparently science-based project. In terms 
of more country-specific objectives, Finland 
has programmes in food RTD and innovation, 
construction materials, and wood products, as 
well as social research specialisations learning, 
social capital, environment and law, and 
developments in Russia. Portugal has a strong 
emphasis on marine sciences and technologies. 
These diversities suggest that strong specialisations 
in public RTD efforts are already present across 
the EU Member States, and that further mapping 
derived from ERAWATCH will be fruitful.
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Introduction
The debate about the reasons behind 
the weakening of relative advantages, or 
competitiveness, of European countries in 
international competition has examined a large 
number of factors. 
This short informal paper argues that one of 
the long term reasons for loss of competitiveness is 
to be found in the poor performance of European 
science in the last quarter of century, which 
largely depends on the structure of European 
academic and research systems. In order to build 
this argument, we will follow several steps.
First, we suggest that a larger part of 
manufacturing and services production depends 
on, or take large benefit from, a large and 
dynamic scientific base. 
Second, we suggest that the inability to lead 
science has negative influences in sectors that 
are technologically very far from the frontier, 
but nevertheless benefit from the scientific 
environment in indirect and unpredictable, but 
highly effective ways. 
Third, we will offer a short case study in 
the field of computer science and the related IT 
and telecommunications industries, based on 
original data. 
Finally, we will show how staying ahead of 
the scientific frontier places new demands on 
the institutions of science and higher education, 
for which European countries have not offered 
adequate responses in the last few decades. 
Consequently, the specialisation of European 
R&D has been focused on fields that have a 
negative composition effects in dynamic terms. 
Some policy conclusions follow.
Science and industry: the neglected 
remote influence
There has been a large research work on the 
relations between science and technology, and 
between technological innovation and industrial 
competitiveness and leadership. The literature 
on sectoral systems of innovation, particularly 
on high technology industries, has reconstructed 
the links between basic research and innovation. 
The studies on non-patent references, patent 
trails, citation flows, and author-inventors have 
done a great job in documenting the increase of 
importance of scientific inputs to manufacturing 
and service innovations. This literature suggests 
that the links between science and innovation are 
never direct and linear, but rather indirect, non-
linear, and largely unpredictable. Nevertheless 
there is sufficient evidence to claim that several 
new industries have been created from scratch 
from the inputs from scientific research (mainly in 
the biotechnology, scientific instrumentation, and 
IT sectors), and that high technology industries 
make increasingly use of scientific knowledge for 
their activity.
See Table 1 for recent detailed evidence 
on the pattern of citations in scientific papers 
written by industrial researchers. The analysis 
covers approximately 230.000 papers published 
by scientists affiliated to top 200 firms (ranking 
by total expenditure in R&D) in more than 7.000 
Linking industrial competitiveness, R&D specialisation 
and the dynamics of knowledge in science: A look at 
remote influences
Andrea Bonaccorsi
University of Pisa, Italy
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scientific journals in the period 1981-1999. What 
is impressive from this analysis is that top 200 
firms make approximately 1 million citations 
to publications of top 110 universities and only 
600.000 citations to industrial publications. 
Moreover, in advanced IT industries (Software 
and business services, Communications services, 
Computers) between 40% and 50% of citations 
made by scientists in companies point to 
publications in Physics.
In our own research on nano-science 
and nanotechnology we have been able to 
demonstrate that patents applications by groups 
of inventors that include both individuals with 
a track record of publications in the field and 
individuals that never published (hence most 
likely industrial researchers) are of better quality 
than patents from inventors that share the same 
pattern of activity (i.e. they all publish in nano 
S&T, or none of them publish).
This work has tried to identify indirect 
effects of science on technology, innovation and 
growth, overcoming the limitations of the simple 
linear model associated to the early neoclassical 
conceptualisation. 
The emphasis has been mainly on the 
distinction between direct impact (i.e. technology 
uses science as an input) and indirect impact 
(i.e. technologists benefits from good training in 
science, or other indirect benefits). This is correct, 
but rather limited.
We suggest there are impacts that are not 
only largely indirect, but also remote in time and 
space, and still extremely influential.
First, there are important effects that are 
remote in time. There may be very remote flows 
of knowledge from pioneering intellectual work, 
early discoveries, initial conceptualisations, 
down to ideas that eventually find their ways 
into technological solutions and then the market. 
The relevant time scale is in the order of several 
decades in most cases. Tracing these flows 
is generally extremely difficult from external 
observers. Documenting flows of ideas on the basis 
of direct citations from papers and patents may 
capture a very limited portion of the real impact. 
Detailed case studies and contributions from the 
history of technology are needed. This creates a 
methodological barrier for economists interested 
in science and technology, that work mainly with 
cross-section data or relatively short time series.
Second, there are important effects that 
are remote in space and/or sector. The impact 
may take place in totally different sectors of the 
economy, ones that transform the knowledge for 
their own purposes to a point that reconstructing 
the original roots may be difficult for external 
observers.
Because of remoteness, it is likely that the 
actual importance of scientific background for 
competitiveness is severely underestimated 
in the current economic debate. Although a 
general validation for this claim would require 
Table 1: Number of citations to papers authored by academic scientists in papers published by 
industrial scientists in several industries, by scientific discipline
Knowledge flows (citations)
Number Chemistry (%) Computer science (%) Engineering (%) Physics (%)
Communications services 26,292 12.1 10.8 22.2 51.4
Software and Business services 25,272 15.1 17.7 17.1 46.3
Electrical equipment 22,896 8.2 9.1 50.3 27.9
Computers 9,210 15.3 13.6 26.5 40.5
Total Industrial sector 217,623 17.7 5.5 22.4 22.4
Source: Adams and Clemmons (2006)
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Table 2: Origins of most important ideas in computer science technology
Top ten ideas in computer science
1. Turing machine (Goldstine and von Neumann; Turing)
2. Programming languags; formal description of syntax ans semantics; LISP (Mc Carthy)
3. Memory hierarchy; cache memory
4. User interface; Graphic User Interface (GUI); concept of window (Xerox Palo Alto Research Center; Apple)
5. Internet (UCLA/DARPA); packet switched multinetworks; http and html protocols; WWW (Berners-Lee)
6. Computational complexity; computational intractability; pseudocausality
7. Relational database
8. Fourier Fast Transform (FFT) (Cooley and Tuckey)
9. Efficient algorythms; data structure (Knuth and Tarjan)
10. Artificial Intelligence
Source: our elaboration from expert opinion, in Bonaccorsi (2000)
new methodologies (for which some work is 
underway), we offer here two illustrative yet 
impressive evidence.
The first example comes from the Information 
Technology industry, in particular the hardware and 
software industries. We asked a small judgmental 
sample of scientific authorities in computer 
science, in both European and US universities, 
to mention the most important technological 
innovations in the industry after Second World 
War and to identify the origins of the idea. 
Table 2 shows the list of top 10 innovations. 
All of them can be traced back to genuine new 
ideas originally conceived in the academic 
world. Although there may be a bias in this 
reconstruction, due to the professional background 
of our respondents, still what is mentioned is 
not pure academic outcome but technological 
breakthroughs, eventually transformed into huge 
worldwide market opportunities. Incidentally, with 
the (partial) exceptions of early pioneering ideas of 
John Von Neumann and of the invention of Internet 
at CERN, all major breakthroughs were originated 
from academic research carried out by American 
scientists and/or in American universities. 
This situation is continuing over time. 
According to some observers, almost all research 
carried out by Microsoft Research in the last 10 
years had its antecedents in academic research 
in the “70s and “80s. The cycle of incubation of 
truly innovative ideas may be very long. 
The second example comes from the 
Telecommunications industry, in particular the 
mobile telecommunication. Here European 
industry has performed well, developing a 
continental standard that facilitated the creation 
of a large market (GSM) and taking the leadership 
with Nokia and Ericsson. EU policy has facilitated 
strong research on pre-standardisation issues 
and appropriate coordination around a standard 
(GSM). However, if we trace back the origins of 
cellular technology, it is interesting to see how 
deep are the intellectual roots. 
Figure 1 offers an ex-post reconstruction 
that goes back to early Post-War research. Again, 
remoteness is evident in both time and sector.
The two examples below are ex-post 
reconstructions, that look backward at the history 
of technology. While remoteness in time can be 
identified with historical approaches or expert 
reconstructions, it is more difficult to identify 
sectoral remoteness. Usual input-output based 
measures of inter-sectoral spillovers fail to identify 
these effects.
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A case in point is given by service industries. 
It is now recognized that innovation in the 
tertiary sector follows different paths than the 
manufacturing industry. Two well recognized 
sources of innovation and increase in productivity 
are Information Technology and the quality of 
human resources.
Although we do not have systematic 
evidence, we put forward the conjecture that 
many innovations in the service sector depend on 
ideas originally developed in the scientific sector, 
and then transformed, adapted and assimilated 
through the action of knowledge producers such 
as software firms and management consultants. 
Many innovations in the service sectors 
take origin from new information technologies 
such as relational databases, workflow systems, 
allocation procedures, route optimisation, process 
engineering and others. These technologies were 
developed to address operational problems, but 
none of them could be developed without the 
rich intellectual background offered by computer 
science starting from the “70s.
The case of Information Technology
It is generally acknowledged that the 
competitive performance of IT industries in Europe 
has been disappointing. As Dalum et al. (1999) 
show on the basis of US patents in the period 
1969-1994, the Revealed Technological Advantage 
(RTA) of Europe in ICT steadily decreases vis-à-
vis competitors, from 0.86 in 1969-74 to 0.84 
in 1979-84 to 0.73 in 1989-94. The European IT 
industry is currently almost completely absent in 
packaged software (with the exception of SAP) and 
innovative services, while a flourishing software 
industry can be found only in customized software 
and services. A good competitive position is found 
only in semiconductors (ST Microelecronics). Since 
the beginning, most of national and EU policies 
Figure 1: Historical milestones of technology and mathematics leading to cellular telecommunication 
systems
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such as Bull (France), Siemens Nixdorf (Germany), 
Olivetti (Italy), ICL (UK). These companies almost 
disappeared from international competition. 
Another large part of industrial and innovation 
policies were aimed at supporting IT developments 
in user industries, such as automotive and 
aerospace, with a strong captive orientation.
We suggest that one of the long term causes 
for the poor performance of the European IT 
industry has been the inability to stay at the 
frontier of science.
Supporting evidence for this claim can 
be found in unpublished research based on 
the analysis of the curriculum vitae (CVs) of 
approximately top 1000 scientists in Computer 
Science (n= 1010). The list of top scientists by 
number of citations received was derived from 
the CiteSeer citation ranking, a universally 
accepted system for automatic updating of 
citations to authors in a large list of both 
academic and technical journals. The list of top 
scientists includes authors of all ages, for which 
we do not control in the following results. We 
have used these data in Bonaccorsi (2006) and 
Bonaccorsi (2008) in order to discuss the poor 
performance of European science. In this paper 
we use other slices of data in order to examine 
the permanent mobility of top scientists, that is, 
the sequence of organisational affiliations over 
the career. The pattern of observed mobility is 
highly revealing, because it is the result of two 
forces. On one hand, universities may want to 
compete for good or promising scientists, offering 
positions. On the other hand, good scientists will 
receive several offers and will make a decision 
contingent on many factors. Among these factors, 
along with personal and family considerations, 
including the salary, the scientific reputation 
of the university and/or the prospects for future 
investments are paramount. Good scientists 
move to a new affiliation if they believe they 
can find good students, exciting colleagues and 
a stimulating research environment. Therefore is 
we see top scientists moving to an affiliation, it 
ultimately means that an equilibrium has been 
found between demand and supply of talent.
Top 1010 computer scientists moved, on 
average, 4,36 times in their career, for a total 
number of affiliation moves of 4418, of which 
3117 academic. Table 3 offers a breakdown of 
affiliation moves in academic places. 
Two elements are striking. First, the top list 
involves only US universities. Top scientists, 
whatever their country origin and nationality, 
move principally within the American academic 
system. Universities of other countries attract 
top scientists only marginally. They are unable to 
attract them, or simply do not compete to attract 
top scientists. The mobility pattern is clearly 
hierarchically organized.
Second, mobility in the top 4 universities 
account for 544 moves, or 17% of the total. More 
than one sixth of the overall career of a global and 
immensely influential community of scientists, 
whose ideas generate large opportunities for the 
world IT industry and beyond, are concentrated 
in just four universities, namely MIT, Stanford, 
Berkeley and Carnegie Mellon.
 
We derive strong implications from this 
evidence. Top scientists, as we have seen from 
Table 1, the main origin of radically innovative 
ideas. Their brilliant PhD students further develop 
these ideas and create start ups, or are recruited 
by large IT companies. In working in the IT 
industry, they still maintain strong linkages with 
the intellectual environment of the academy. This 
system is open to any newcomer, but is also highly 
structured. Competition is fierce. The system is 
multi-layered: universities that do not have a 
track record of excellent quality and exciting 
scientific environment cannot compete for these 
scientists, whatever the resources they have. Data 
tell us that few European universities compete in 
upper echelons. This is one (perhaps one of the 
most important) reasons behind the decline in 
competitiveness of the European IT industry.
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mobility paths of top 1000 Computer scientists
Institution Count
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 174
Standford University 166
University of California at Berkeley 102
Carnegie-Mellon University 102
University of Illinois 59
University of Maryland 58
Cornell University 52
University of Washington 45
University of Pennsylvania 44
Harvard University 44
Princeton University 44
University of Texas 44
University of Massachusetts 42
Brown University 41
University of Toronto 34
Source: Bonaccorsi (2007)
Implications for institutional design
Why has European science been weak 
in playing the big game of frontier science in 
Information Technology?
We suggest that this is just a case of a 
more general problem, namely the inability of 
European institutions of science to adapt to fast 
moving scientific fields, or search regimes.
Figure 2 places scientific fields in a space 
in which the vertical axis describes the rate of 
growth (rapid or turbulent vs slow growth) and 
the horizontal axis describes both the pattern of 
diversity (convergence vs proliferation) and the type 
of complementarity (physical complementarity 
vs institutional complementarity). European 
science has historically been strong in two types 
of search regimes: scientific fields characterized 
by slow growth or high growth, but limited 
degrees of complementarity, such as mathematics 
or conventional chemistry, and scientific fields 
characterized by strong complementarity of 
physical type, but convergent pattern of search, 
such as particle physics and astrophysics. 
European science has developed separate 
institutions at national, intergovernmental 
and European level, for dealing with search 
regimes with strong physical infrastructure 
complementarities (e.g. high energy physics, 
astronomy, space research, oceanography, 
nuclear technology).
In the field of technology, the case of 
aeronautics and space is interesting: there 
have been separate institutions in research (the 
European Space Agency (ESA)) and industry 
(Airbus), relatively independent from other fields, 
while the coordination around a focal artefact 
facilitated complementarity.
It is much more difficult to provide rapidly 
emerging fields the required complementarities 
in terms of human capital within the common 
institutional framework. There are few rapid 
growth mechanisms in European science.
Our propositions therefore are as follows.
1. The relationships between science and 
technology have changed deeply in the 
last part of the 20th century,
2. There is an indirect but strong relation 
between long term industrial (and 
service) productivity and competitiveness 
and the underlying dynamics of scientific 
knowledge production,
3. Europe is relatively de-specialised in 
leading scientific fields that form the 
knowledge base for large industrial/
tertiary sectors. In particular IT and 
life sciences, whose search regime is 
characterized by fast rate of growth, 
proliferation dynamics and new forms of 
complementarity.
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In this short paper, we have suggested, quite 
radically, that the poor performance of European 
high technology industries is rooted in the 
weakness of European science.
Contrary to the common wisdom (the so 
called “European paradox”), European science 
in several fields, including IT, lags behind the US 
and Asia. Almost all technological breakthroughs 
in IT have their origin (although indirect and 
lagged) into radically new ideas created in the 
scientific environment. 
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Charles Clarke, the UK’s education secretary 
from 2002 to 2004, once asked: “Should we enable 
more of the best researchers to focus on research, 
and develop a more professional teaching force for 
universities specialising in teaching?” The drift of 
research funding decisions in British universities 
since then has been to concentrate resources on a 
few key institutions that already command the bulk 
of research finance. We have been told that world-
class research requires “critical mass”, and this is 
to be found in the “golden triangle” formed by 
Oxford, Cambridge, and London; those institutions 
elsewhere that do not have critical mass would be 
better left without any research funding at all than 
encouraged to continue to waste national resources 
on the small-scale, low-value projects that are the 
only kind of work they are capable of.8
Is there critical mass in research? How big is 
it? These are essentially factual questions; no doubt 
the truth varies, depending on whether we are 
talking about art history or particle accelerators. 
In any case I do not claim to know the answer. 
But I am thoroughly familiar with the question, 
which has been asked before. In my own research 
I have studied how government officials in the 
USSR allocated scarce funding among competing 
research and development projects in Soviet aero 
engineering in the 1930s and 1940s9. What we find 
8 Editors’ note: Professor Mark Harrison was not present 
at the workshop. However, his short note, written in July 
2003 in the context of a national debate on university 
funding in the UK, remains topical. We thank him for 
granting us permission to include it in this compilation. 
9 For results see Harrison (2003), “The Political Economy of 
a Soviet Military R&D Failure: Steam Power for Aviation, 
1932 to 1939”, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 63, No. 
1, pp. 178-212; Harrison (2005), “A Soviet Quasi-Market 
for Inventions: Jet Propulsion, 1932 to 1946”, Research in 
Economic History, Vol. 23, pp. 1-59.
is that, in the secret military core of a command 
system dominated by a harsh dictatorship, nobody 
was able to make a lasting decision about the 
best way to organise research. On one side were 
proponents of competition. They believed that the 
right framework within which good ideas for the 
future of aerospace could best emerge and be most 
easily spotted and selected for further development 
was to spread the limited funding available over 
many projects. Many would fail but a few would 
succeed and that would be enough. On the other 
side were the advocates of concentration. They 
found the waste and duplication of competitive 
funding unacceptable. An advantage of the 
planned economy, they argued, was its potential 
for bigger projects that could be controlled more 
tightly from the centre: in short, a potential for 
“critical mass”.
The result was an institutional cycle. In the 
first phase of the cycle, competition ruled. Soviet 
funding officials would announce a new mission, 
for example, to build a new type of engine. Many 
hopeful designers would set out their research 
proposals. Behind closed doors they lobbied 
and negotiated for funding; sometimes they even 
diverted funding from an existing project to a new 
one to get a head start and win some credibility. 
It was hard for officials to decide who had the 
best chance of success so the cash was shared 
out among many. As the work got under way the 
projects already funded tended to attract further 
financing more or less regardless of results; after 
all, by now money had already been committed 
and it became hard for funding officials to cut off 
projects they had authorised previously without 
looking bad because they had nothing to show for 
it. At the same time new technological possibilities 
began to emerge from the work already done 
Does High-Quality Research Require “Critical Mass”?
Mark Harrison8
University of Warwick, United Kingdom
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so still more projects were designated and 
authorised. Funding obligations multiplied. At 
a certain point the higher Soviet authorities lost 
patience with rising expenses and lack of results, 
and announced a turn to “critical mass”. The 
problem, they declared, was that money had been 
scattered over too many small-scale, low-value 
efforts; there was a need to concentrate efforts 
and focus them more narrowly. The second phase 
began. Who would lose funding? Some designers 
fought back: they lobbied defensively to protect 
their funding, or they acted aggressively to try to 
gobble up the organisations of other designers 
in a weaker position. In the outcome, however, 
judgements had to be made and funding removed 
from those projects judged less successful, which 
were terminated; the money saved could then 
be concentrated on a smaller number of bigger 
projects that reflected a narrower mission and 
more sharply defined priorities.
In the process research monopolies were 
created that went on to behave like monopolies: 
they consumed resources, increased costs, 
and restricted output. Moreover, in the rush to 
rationalise, the officials in charge of funding 
generally made some mistakes. They would have 
liked to curtail only bad projects and save the 
good ones, but they often made bad decisions, 
sometimes out of ignorance or myopia, sometimes 
because they were swayed by the influence 
of designers who were better at lobbying and 
persuading than at organising research. And yes, 
such people do exist, even among high-minded 
academics at top universities. Once it was 
realised that the concentration drive had gone 
wrong the arguments in favour of competition 
and pluralism tended to be rediscovered. The 
cycle began again.
Of course there are some differences between 
the cycle that we find at work in the Soviet 
command system under Stalin and the working 
of our own research councils and department 
of education under Charles Clarke. In Britain 
today no one is shot or imprisoned for a mistaken 
funding decision or a faulty design. Personal 
consequences aside, however, the parallels are 
remarkably similar. The underlying reason is that 
in both cases we are dealing with research for the 
value of which there is no good market test, but 
there is no good bureaucratic test either.
I predict, therefore, that five or ten years from 
now another education secretary will discover that 
today’s policy of concentrating research funding 
in pursuit of “critical mass” was mistaken, or at 
least was taken too far. The monopolistic research 
giants of the golden triangle will receive stinging 
criticisms for their lethargy, bureaucracy, and 
capacity to absorb funding without giving results. 
There will be much wisdom after the event. We 
will hear speeches full of regret for the blight 
that the theory of “critical mass” spread through 
Britain’s higher educational periphery in the 
first years of the new millennium: the emerging 
research groups in second-rank universities that 
lost their funding, the small but promising centres 
closed, the individual careers curtailed. Ministers 
and research council chiefs will announce 
a new era of competition and pluralism, in 
which funding will be spread in small, rationed 
instalments right through to the periphery of the 
higher education system.
But the new era will again turn out to be 
shorter than anticipated. Ten or fifteen years 
from now yet another education secretary will 
be making a speech on – yes: the importance of 
“critical mass”!
55
Th
e 
Q
ue
st
io
n 
of
 R
&
D
 S
pe
ci
al
is
at
io
n:
 P
er
sp
ec
tiv
es
 a
nd
 p
ol
ic
y 
im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
Introduction
The EU’s 2010 goals for R&D expenditure 
were set out in the Lisbon Summit Strategy 
and endorsed by European Heads of State and 
Government in Brussels in 2002. The two main 
targets were:
•	 To	 increase	 EU	 R&D	 intensity	 (R&D	
expenditure divided by GDP) from 1.8% in 
late 1990s to about 3% by 2010,
•	 One	third	of	this	spending	was	to	be	funded	
by government, with the rest coming from 
the business sector.
The above targets have been motivated by 
the fact that the EU remained behind the US 
and Japan in R&D intensity. Current annual R&D 
expenditure will have to skyrocket over the next 
two years if the goals settled in Lisbon Agenda 
are to be fulfilled. 
For the time being the situation is the 
following: Total EU R&D activities have stayed 
stable over the last 3 years with R&D intensity 
hovering at the level of 1.84%, according to 
the latest figures released from EUROSTAT, the 
Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
Although such EU members as Sweden and 
Finland have reached quite high R&D intensity 
(in Sweden several years ago it exceeded 3%), the 
majority of EU countries are significantly below 
the level of 2%. By contrast, some American 
States have R&D intensity of 4%, whereas no EU 
country shows as highly. The following reasons 
can be put forward for such a situation:
•	 The	 stagnation	 of	 EU	 R&D	 intensity	 can	
be partly explained by the decrease in 
government funded R&D in several large 
European countries. 
•	 In	 different	 countries	 different	 industries	
are important. More than 60% of EU R&D 
spending is contributed by the three top 
countries – France, Germany and the UK. If 
we take a look only on these three countries, 
we see that pharmaceutical industries are 
important in overall R&D expenditure in the 
UK, but in France and Germany they are less 
significant. In Germany, engineering and 
chemical sectors are important, but these 
sectors spend a lower ratio of revenues on 
R&D. This fact explains the slower growth of 
R&D expenditure in Germany in comparison 
with the UK. 
•	 Another	possible	 reason	 for	 the	 stable	 level	
of Europe's R&D intensity is the EU research 
specialisation in traditional and slow 
growing areas. In many countries, members 
of the EU, there is a fear of investment in 
new, fast growing spheres, such as lasers or 
nanotechnology. Such fields are considered 
to be risky and these fields require more R&D 
activities than the traditional disciplines. 
•	 There	 are	 still	 barriers	 to	 the	 mobility	 of	
researchers that have to be removed. Larger 
markets are linked with larger returns 
from R&D activities. An example is the US 
market, a huge market with one language 
and one regulation regime. The EU is not 
a federation of states; it is a community of 
27 countries, with different languages and 
R&D Specialisation and the Lisbon Strategy
Antanas enys
Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, Lithuania
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regulation regimes. The European market 
for technology is still quite fragmented, 
mostly due to the patent system. If a patent is 
granted by the European Patent Office (EPO) 
it has to be translated and enforced by other 
patent offices. This makes the process of 
acknowledgment of the patent granted in one 
EU member by others long and expensive. 
This problem is one of the hardest to solve, 
but also having a huge influence to R&D 
expenditure efficiency. The research systems 
have to be connected for more efficient and 
effective work.
•	 The	 success	 of	 Sweden	 is	 conditioned	 not	
by the size of the market, but by the level 
of academic research expenditures in the 
country. The high spending on academic 
R&D stimulates business R&D. Activities 
geared towards academic research facilitate 
the generation of new ideas by universities. 
University-produced ideas are then used 
by the business sector and stimulate its 
development. So the inefficient distribution of 
R&D activities in the academic area can result 
in unsatisfactory results in terms of business 
R&D and R&D in general. Additionally, 
successful academic research can attract 
more funding from the business sector.
 
To cope with the problems mentioned above 
the EU has to improve its R&D specialisation 
policy.
The issue of specialisation
R&D specialisation is the concentration of 
R&D activities within some thematic area. The 
problem of R&D specialisation, in general and in 
the EU in particular, is related to the distribution 
of activities. We can image two extreme options 
in this distribution:
•	 When	 all	 activities	 are	 concentrated	 in	 the	
margins of some specific and narrow area.
•	 When	 activities	 are	 spread	 among	 many	
thematic spheres, trying to support more 
scientific, technological or industrial fields. 
Both options have their advantages and 
disadvantages. In the first case the selected 
thematic area will receive enough activities, but 
specialisation in one area implies less progress 
in another. For its turn the diffusion of activities 
between several fields will cause the decrease in 
amount of activities for every sphere separately. 
So there should be balance, returns from the 
concentration in one area have to compensate 
the damage in other areas. There are fields that 
need less activity, but the output from such 
spheres is usually not big. On the other hand, 
there are areas which give big outputs and which 
are going to develop in future, but such areas are 
typically risky and they need a lot of work. Most 
EU countries are more orientated to less risky, but 
slowly growing, more traditional research areas, 
which need less R&D spending. This is one of the 
reasons why the EU is staying behind the US in 
R&D expenditure and is the thing that have to be 
improved. But due to fragmentation of the EU this 
is hard to change. 
The importance of a strong higher 
education sector
The lack of R&D spending in the higher 
education sector is part of the problem. The 
complexity of connection between European 
universities is harming the competitiveness and 
quality of education in the EU. It is also pushing 
EU business to make R&D investments outside 
the margins of the EU. The second thing that is 
harming the quality of education in the EU is the 
lack of autonomy and diversity of the universities. 
The European higher education system is in need 
of rapid diversification to enable its universities 
to cooperate and make them more attractive for 
private R&D investments. On the other hand 
the lack of competition between European 
universities has a negative impact on the quality 
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resulting in fewer R&D investments. Though the 
EU produces more higher education graduates 
and doctorates in science and technology than 
the US and Japan, the percentage of them at work 
as researchers is much higher there. If the Lisbon 
Strategy objectives are to be met, the EU has to 
have 700,000 researchers by 2010 – a figure that 
now seems difficult to reach. Europe is viewed as 
a union in an economic and political respect, but 
not in terms of higher education.
When it comes to higher education, the 
perception focuses on the continent’s individual 
countries, and mostly on the larger ones. In such 
a setting, Europe’s higher education institutions 
receive good marks. But on a number of issues, such 
as prestige of institutions, labour-market acceptance 
of qualifications, and dynamism and innovation 
force, it came out second to the US. The concepts 
that are associated with European universities are 
culture, tradition and history, whereas in US they 
are progress, reputation and innovation. A solution 
to the problems of higher education in Europe will 
help improve the efficiency of R&D expenditure 
and increase the private R&D investments in the 
higher education sector.
A sectoral view of Europe’s low R&D 
intensity
Europe’s R&D intensity remains at a lower level 
than those of other main economic players in the 
world and has not improved over the last decade. It 
is stagnating, in spite of the goals set by the Lisbon 
Strategy. The main reason for such a situation is 
the lack of business funding of R&D in Europe. 
Two thirds of all R&D expenditure worldwide is 
carried out by the business sector, which is why 
one of the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy was 
to increase the private sector contribution to R&D 
to two thirds by 2010. In spite of this the business 
funding of R&D did not increase over the last 
10 years and stayed unchanged in the same way 
like the EU R&D intensity in general. In 2004 the 
private sector financed 64% of total R&D in US, 
67% in China and 75% in Japan and South Korea 
comparing with only 55% in the EU. The deficit of 
private R&D explains the 87% of the gap between 
the EU and the US R&D intensity. Privately-funded 
R&D is clearly increasing in the US over the past 
ten years, as is also in China and Japan. In all these 
countries the financing of R&D by the private 
sector has increased in a much faster pace than in 
the EU. As a result the gap between the EU and the 
US and Japan has widened significantly over the 
past decade. It has to be taken into consideration, 
that the level of business-funded R&D is slightly 
underestimated due to the impossibility of 
breakdown in the category “funded from abroad” 
between public and private sources. But in view of 
the fact that the level of the “funding from abroad” 
in the EU-27 is only 0.16% of GDP (2005), this 
margin of error does not explain the gap in the EU 
R&D intensity. The major reason is still the lack of 
the private contribution to R&D funding. 
The business sector is not only the principal 
financing sector of R&D, it is also the main 
performer of R&D. The business sector is the 
closest to consumers, so it is the best positioned 
in terms of generating new ideas with economic 
applications, using existing knowledge in new 
fields and making use of new ideas commercially. 
To involve the business sector in research and 
development is therefore crucial for Europe to 
ensure future growth and competitiveness. As the 
overall R&D investment position in the EU remains 
on the lower levels then in the most of the other 
main world regions. Due to the universal process 
of globalisation, the R&D investment is becoming 
more and more internationalized. According to the 
OECD, there has been a significant improvement 
in the level of the international controlled business 
R&D. the share of domestic business R&D 
controlled by foreign affiliates increased from 
12% in 1993 to 16.5% in 2001 in the OECD area. 
One of the reasons of the low R&D intensity in the 
EU is the decision of some EU companies to carry 
out the R&D activities in the US rather than in the 
EU in order to benefit from American expertise 
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or market openings. One would have expected 
that there will be the opposite phenomenon of 
the American companies carrying they research 
in the EU in order to benefit from local expertise. 
However this is not the case. There is evidence that 
EU companies tend to invest more in R&D in the 
US, then US companies in the EU. Moreover there 
are emerging world economies that are attracting 
investors and becoming important locations for 
the international R&D expenditure. A survey 
carried by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2004) 
has shown that the favourite location for future 
R&D investments for many large EU companies 
are China, followed by US and India. This fact 
explains the diminution of the EU share in US 
outward R&D spending and this trend is going to 
continue as the new marker players are emerging 
and opening their markets to foreign investors.
Compared to the US, the EU has a very 
low level of R&D expenditure in the services 
sector. One may think that the reason behind 
the gap between US and EU R&D intensity 
can be found in the services sector. However 
recent surveys have determined that there are 
comparability problems with industry-level data 
on R&D spending. The conclusion is that the R&D 
expenditure in services is overestimated in the US 
in comparison with the EU. The main thing that 
prevents the comparability across countries is the 
differences in the methods they use to classify the 
R&D by industrial activities. While in the US all 
firms are classified by the principal activity only, 
in the EU the majority of countries are using 
product field information to re-allocate R&D 
expenditure (among the 13 EU-27 member states 
covered in OECD’s ANBERD (Analytical Business 
Enterprise Research and Development) statistics, 
eight use product field information to re-allocate 
R&D expenditure, and only five use the principal 
activity criterion). This may explain the part of the 
difference between the US and the EU share in 
R&D expenditure. 
At least three quarters of business R&D 
expenditure is located in manufacturing industries 
as in the US, as in the EU. The comparison of 
the diffusion of manufacturing R&D across 
industrial sectors according to their technology 
intensity shows that in the US manufacturing 
R&D is more concentrated in high-tech industries 
than in the EU. In the EU, manufacturing R&D 
is more concentrated in medium-high-tech and 
in medium-low-tech industries. Therefore the 
larger concentration in high-tech manufacturing 
in the US can be explained by the differences in 
industrial structure between the US and the EU. 
EU companies considered sector by sector 
appear to be as R&D intensive as their US 
counterparts. The deficit in the private R&D sector 
is mostly due to differences in industry structure 
and the smaller size of the high-tech sectors. 67% 
of US corporate R&D investment is made up 
by companies belonging to high R&D intensity 
sectors compared with only 36% in the EU.
Taking into consideration that the EU R&D 
deficit with the US appears to be located in the 
high-tech sector, it is necessary to examine EU-
US differences in the high-tech industry and the 
relative importance of the each sector in the R&D 
funding gap. The fact that EU R&D is more focused 
on the medium-high-tech level reflects the deeper 
concentration of attention on this sector. Examining 
the high-tech sector, one can see that:
•	 The	 chemical	 industries	 sector	 is	 equally	
large in the EU and the US, somewhat bigger 
in the EU, and it is equally R&D intensive in 
both economies. So it does not explain the 
differences between the EU and the US. 
•	 Aircraft	and	spacecraft	industries	have	same	
R&D intensities as in the US as in the EU, but 
in the US this sector is twice as big as in the 
EU. It contributes to the higher concentration 
of the R&D expenditure in the high-tech 
industries, but only due to the sector's size.
•	 The	 ICT	 manufacturing	 industries	 largely	
explain the higher concentration of the high-
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of this sector and the R&D intensity of it. 
•	 Office,	accounting	and	computing	machinery	
sector is much more R&D intensive in the US 
than in the EU, but it is very small in the both 
economies.
•	 Radio,	 television	 and	 communication	
equipment is slightly less R&D intensive in the 
US, but it is 60% bigger there than in the EU.
•	 Medical	 precision	 and	 optical	 instruments	
sector is twice as R&D intensive and almost 
50% bigger in the US.
A conclusion that one can make is that ICT 
manufacturing conditions the differences in R&D 
expenditures between the EU and the US, not 
only because it tends to be more R&D intensive 
but also due to its large size. 
Taking a look at the medium-high-tech sector 
one can see that:
•	 The	 Railroad	 and	 transport	 equipment-
manufacturing sector is more R&D intensive 
in the US, but this sector is very small in 
both economies, so it could not play a 
significant role in explaining the appearance 
of the funding gap between US and EU R&D 
expenditure.
•	 "Motor	 vehicles"	 also	 plays	 a	 rather	 limited	
role: it is only slightly bigger and more R&D 
intensive in the EU.
•	 The	 major	 difference	 comes	 from	 the	
machinery and equipment sector and the 
electrical machinery sector. These sectors are 
twice as large and more R&D intensive in 
the EU than in the US. 
Here again, the differences between the EU 
and the US depend on the structural differences 
and the larger size of sectors. 
The Lisbon goals in the context of 
increasing internationalisation
According to the 2007 edition of the Key 
Figures by the European Commission (Duchêne 
et al., 2007), EU member states can be divided 
into three groups: 
1. Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany and 
Austria. These countries have the R&D 
intensity above 2.4% and are also on the 
top of the ranking of R&D intensive Member 
States.
2. France, Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg. These countries are 
close to the EU average and have the R&D 
intensity varying from 1.5% to 2.2% from 
GDP. From these countries only France has 
R&D expenditure over the average.
3. The third group includes the Southern 
European countries and the new members 
of the EU. These countries show the R&D 
intensity below 1.5%. The fluctuation inside 
this group is still very big with the countries 
like Czech Republic and Slovenia having the 
R&D intensity at a level higher than 1%, and 
the countries like Romania spending less 
than 0.4% of GDP to R&D. 
The first group’s countries, except Sweden, 
have increased their R&D expenditure during 
the period between 2000-2005. The spending of 
GDP to R&D in the Member States belonging to 
the second group has declined in the period from 
2000 to 2005. The countries of the third group 
are improving their R&D intensity, though in the 
different speed. But the six Member States with 
the R&D expenditure at a level lower than 0.67% 
(Greece, Poland, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Romania) have been falling further 
behind since 2000.
26 Member States have set the targets for 
their R&D intensities by 2010. If all these goals 
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will be reached, the EU R&D intensity will be 
at about 2.6% by 2010. The counties that are 
already reached very high showing in their R&D 
expenditures will be able to advance towards 
their targets. The large group of EU members has 
experienced the positive average of growth since 
200, but they will still need to improve their R&D 
intensity significantly to reach their goals by 2010. 
However an equally large group has experienced 
decreasing of the part of GDP spend on R&D. 
In 2005 54.5% of R&D expenditure in the 
EU were financed by private sector, 34.5% (that 
is nearly one third of total R&D expenditure)- by 
government, and 8.5% - “from abroad”, as by 
private as by public sources. The countries of 
southern Europe and new members of the EU are 
characterized by the high level of government 
involvement into R&D financing. In 2005 more 
than 60% of R&D expenditure were financed 
by government is such countries like Poland, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania and Cyprus. In Member States 
with high R&D intensity like Sweden, Finland, 
Germany and Denmark the private sector is 
financing the larger part of R&D spending.
In view of the impossibility of the breakdown 
between private and public sources in the 
category from abroad and bearing in mind that 
large part of 8.5% of R&D expenditure financed 
from abroad is financed by private sector, it is clear 
that the share of private sector in the financing of 
domestic R&D is higher than 54.5%. This factor 
could be very important for such countries like 
the UK and Greece, where nearly one fifth of total 
R&D expenditure is financed “from abroad”.
The role of the government involvement in 
R&D financing should not be underestimated. 
In the high R&D intensive Member States like 
Sweden and Austria where the share in the 
domestic R&D financing is large, the contribution 
from the government to R&D expenditure is 
plays a very important role. High levels of private 
sector financing of R&D go hand-in-hand with 
high levels of public sector funding. In low 
R&D-intensive countries the involvement of the 
government in the R&D funding is much more 
important than the involvement of the private 
sector. The government funding is significant in 
the creating science and technology capabilities 
and in financing research projects with high 
expectations of social benefits, which would 
not attract the attention of the private sector 
investors.
The globalisation of R&D has definitely 
intensified over the last few years. In 2004, 
about 20 to 50% of domestic business R&D 
funding was financed by foreign affiliates (20% in 
Poland, Greece and Finland, 50% in Ireland and 
Hungary). The share of foreign affiliates in total 
R&D expenditure has expanded considerably 
in a number of new Member States – the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary – as 
well as in Sweden. In Germany, Ireland, Greece, 
the Netherlands, France, Spain, Portugal and 
Finland the increase was less marked, but still 
substantial. It can be clearly seen that business 
R&D in Member States relies strongly on the 
foreign financing.
R&D intensity of foreign companies however 
remains below the R&D intensity of national 
companies in most countries. The R&D intensity 
of domestic companies in the EU varies from 
0.01% in Greece to 2.59% in Sweden and 3.06% 
in Finland. The R&D intensity of national firms in 
Finland is twice as high as in France and Germany 
and tree times as high as that of national firms in 
the United Kingdom. In other countries it is lower 
than 1%.
In most countries national companies 
carry out more R&D than foreign affiliates. It is 
the case in Finland, Germany, France, Greece, 
Spain, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia. However 
for Belgium, Hungary and Ireland the contrary 
holds true. In these tree countries the R&D of 
foreign companies outpaces that of domestic 
firms (Duchêne et al., 2007). Therefore in these 
countries business R&D is extremely dependent 
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that some firms are known to transfer their 
technologies directly to their affiliates: while 
this activity is not captured by R&D spending, 
nevertheless foreign affiliates do bring new 
technologies into the country. 
The level of the attractiveness of the country 
for R&D can be appreciated by comparing the 
share of R&D expenditure of foreign affiliates 
to their share of the turnover in the country. A 
country where foreign companies contribute 
more to total R&D expenditure than to total 
turnover is considered to be relatively attractive 
for the R&D activities. 
Countries where the share of foreign 
companies in total manufacturing R&D 
expenditure is significantly higher than the 
share of these companies in total manufacturing 
turnover may be more attractive for R&D than 
for production activities. This is the case for 
Portugal and, to a lesser extent for the Czech 
Republic, Spain, Italy, Hungary and Sweden. 
But for some of these countries this observation 
can be explained by the limited R&D efforts of 
the national companies. It could also depend 
on the location of foreign affiliates in R&D-
intensive sectors. In Germany, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom the share of the foreign affiliates 
in total R&D is very similar to their share in the 
total manufacturing turnover. That means that 
these countries are equally attractive for R&D as 
for production activities. Poland and for much 
lesser extent France, the Netherlands and Finland 
are the countries in which the contribution of 
foreign firms to turnover significantly exceeds 
their contribution to total R&D, so these countries 
are less attractive for R&D activities than for 
production activities. Foreign companies may 
prefer to transfer technology to these countries 
directly rather than to set up there local R&D 
activities.
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Introduction
The issue of R&D specialisation has to take 
into account the relations between specialisation 
and a number of other issues such as: 
a) the choice of specialisations (the substance 
of specialisation) to be enhanced, 
b) the right balance between pro-active 
and more neutral or reactive policies on 
technological and research specialisation, 
c) the fragmentation issue seen under the 
perspective of economies of scale, of scope 
and of excellence, 
d) the concentration issue and the disadvantages 
of restricted competition, 
e) the concepts of externalities and public 
goods, combined with the concept of state 
failures, 
f) the probability of divergent growth rates, 
standards of living and employment 
opportunities, and the trade-offs to be made 
(the issue of intra-EU convergence). 
On the R&D specialisation in the EU five 
dimensions are to be underlined in the present 
context:
•	 The	EU	in	world	terms	is	lagging	behind	the	
pioneers in core technologies, especially 
in ICT technologies. This produces adverse 
consequences in terms of productivity, 
productivity growth, market positions and 
business strengths.
•	 The	capability	of	the	EU	to	be	an	early	comer	
concerning the development of a number 
of emerging technologies will influence 
the competitiveness and the capability of 
the European Union in the years to come 
to succeed in achieving the benefits of 
technological leadership in crucial research 
and productive fields.
•	 Any	 initial	 lagging	position,	as	 today	 in	 the	
case of ICT technologies, makes necessary 
the implementation of policies aiming at 
closing the gap either by enhanced research, 
or by technology diffusion, transfer and 
application.
•	 Significant	 visible	 future	 challenges	 have	
to be faced at a world scale during the 
next few decades, especially with regard to 
energy, environment and climate change 
and their much broader implications (health, 
alternative social organisational schemes, 
transports etc).
•	 R&D	 specialisation	 focuses	 on	 structural	
issues concerning the productive system 
of the EU. However, macroeconomic and 
other policies are much more influential 
in determining performance in any term 
(economic or social). Hence, the relation 
between R&D, R&D specialisation and 
(at least) macroeconomic policies has to 
be examined in a more detailed way. The 
present trends show very clearly how growth, 
employment, stability and standards of living 
are determined by the complex interplay of 
many factors, among which the impact of a 
performing R&D specialisation depends on 
the whole interplay of these factors.
Towards an appropriate policy mix for specialisation
Anastasios Giannitsis 
University of Athens, Greece
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Three types of policy
R&D and technological specialisation can 
be achieved through various policies, according 
to the policy objective, such as:
a) Preservation of existing specialisations
b) Enhancement of successful specialisations
c) Prolonging product cycles
d) Diffusion of technologies and innovations 
into new areas
e) Enhancement of new more radical 
technological changes 
In turn these strategies can be classified 
under three main headings:
•	 Strategies	 of	 technological	 leadership	 (case	
e)
•	 Upgrading	strategies	(cases	a,	b	and	c)
•	 Strategies	of	late	followers	leading	eventually	
to strategies of fast followers (case d and b).
Pro-active R&D specialisation policies 
(especially in the framework of the ERA policies) 
raise the question of the relevant specialisation 
areas to be targeted. The ERA as a primary EU 
objective is in fact an instrument supposed to 
contribute to the achievement of the Lisbon 
goals, in particular competitiveness, growth, 
employment, standards of living. ERA in itself 
has not an explicit and specifically predefined 
focus on research specialisation, or on areas of 
gravity and research objectives. The lack of an 
explicit delineation of such priorities is not to 
confuse with a vacuum. The areas of gravity are 
implicitly outlined. Since the objective is to make 
of the EU "the most dynamic and competitive 
knowledge-based economy in the world capable 
of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion..", this by 
definition implies the need for the EU to develop 
capabilities on those (existing and/or emerging) 
scientific and technological trajectories, the 
dynamics of which drives forward economic 
growth and welfare in world competition in the 
present phase. In this sense, the various high 
tech (and, selectively, even medium to high tech) 
areas occupy a central place. This underlines 
how important is to recognize at an early stage 
the dynamics of new technical change and 
innovations within sectors and/or clusters. 
In other words, in order to meet the ERA and 
the revised Lisbon goals, research, technology 
and innovation policies have to target both the 
strengthening of existing industrial structures 
and the preparation for more radical technical 
changes. Experience has showed that being 
a latecomer in core technologies has serious 
implications which last for long, are difficult 
to reverse and affect economic and social 
performance. In the example of ICT technologies it 
becomes apparent, that followers do not succeed 
in avoiding productivity and competitiveness 
gaps as against leaders. Foremost, technological 
leaders are facilitated to expand into new science 
and technology fields and create conditions for 
reiterating such processes in further emerging 
science and technology areas.
Pro-active R&D and technological 
specialisation policies are seen with some 
skepticism because of two major policy 
drawbacks: a) the failures of past interventionist 
industrial policies, and b) the high risks associated 
with pro-active policies in general and even 
more so with research and technology policies. 
As against these experiences, there are other 
elements which allow a reconsideration of the 
issue under a new angle:
•	 The	 risks	 of	 the	 no-policy	 (or	 reactive	 or	
neutral) choice,
•	 The	risk	of	retrogression	and
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ns•	 The	shaping	of	a	more	flexible	fine-tuning	of	
policies, which is prevailing in many other 
policy areas. 
The risk of no-policy (reactive and/or 
neutral policies)
Specialisation policies either for 
strengthening existing industrial structures or 
for catching-up technological leaders, but in 
particular for promoting emerging technological 
fields, involve risks. In principle, the most 
known and visible risks are the risks of failure. 
This is half of the reality. The other half is that 
in absence of any action, risks are equally 
present. Inertia is not deprived from risks and 
costs. The difference to pro-active policies is of 
political nature. It cannot be directly associated 
with the option of no-policy. It has no direct 
visible political cost. However, the risk to 
neglect or to delay technological advancement 
and to lose ground at the international level 
can be significant in terms of growth, income, 
employment, competitiveness, market positions 
and environmental degradation. To the extent 
also that the speed with which the big social 
issues on energy, environment, health etc. will 
be tackled appears today to be of paramount 
importance, the rapidity of policy implementation 
becomes a significant factor. Not only because 
it is important to avoid duplicating the adverse 
experience with ICT technologies, but also 
because the needs to be covered make timely 
research results extremely important. 
As a result, it could be argued that in the 
present conditions both pro-active and reactive 
(or passive or neutral) R&D and technology 
specialisation policies might have risks and costs. 
The difference between passive and more active 
policies is that in the case of the former (and of 
wrong policy decisions), cost rather than being a 
probability becomes a certainty. 
The risk of failure in meeting significant 
social challenges
In the next future our societies are faced 
with qualitatively different challenges than in the 
past. What is at stake in this phase is not just the 
issue of national or continental convergence to 
the USA or the enhancement of capabilities for 
growth in comparison to third competitors or 
the creation of knowledge for achieving higher 
standards of living. In the past, the leaders in 
each new core technology could achieve higher 
standards of living, create conditions of a more 
dynamic evolution, draw benefits in terms of 
political power, influence and welfare, and, 
according to policy values, enhance the social 
state. In the present phase we are faced with 
numerous gloomy predictions concerning the 
climatic change, environment and energy, and 
their broader implications on health, food, water 
and other aspects (massive migration, conflicts) at 
a global scale. 
In all these cases what is at stake is not simply 
to obtain at a later stage the necessary scientific 
and technological tools to face the new challenges 
and to have lose the gains from a success at an 
earlier stage. The risks associated with slow 
progress on some critical technologies are of a 
more generic nature, implying the deterioration 
of economic and social situations worldwide. 
Some particular technological fields are today of 
such an important priority that a failure has high 
social costs at all levels (EU, national, regional 
eventually also global). Inversely, a success could 
result in significant benefits in economic, social 
and even political terms (e.g. stability). Briefly, 
because of the high social priorities associated 
with some knowledge areas, pro-active R&D 
specialisation policies in a range of areas are 
not simply an economic priority but also a 
significant social priority. Focusing on these top 
necessities and not on particular players (firms, 
organisations) is a quite different approach than 
the past strategies of picking winners. Hence, 
what is at stake is how to avoid potential major 
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retrogressions on crucial areas, how to prepare 
early enough the tools for meeting big challenges 
and how to adapt efficiently to an emerging 
new world landscape. Obviously, the successful 
management of these policy issues will ensure 
success in conventional economic terms as well. 
The diversified technological base of the 
future
Basically, the future phase seems not anymore 
to be dominated by one basic technology and/or 
one “key factor” a la Freeman. Many sets of frontier 
technologies are continuously developed in an 
ongoing race process. Depending on the size and 
the capabilities, it is rationale to try to strengthen 
positions in broader areas of frontier research. 
Who will gain early enough strong positions in 
the evolving technological trajectories will be 
also capable to draw significant benefits both of 
economic nature and in the form of achieving 
economic and social structures compatible to 
the new global challenges. Obviously, the case 
of emerging technologies is more controversial. 
Market signals are not yet strong and risks of failure 
are higher. On the other hand, core technologies 
take many decades to be developed and the history 
of technological evolutions shows that:
•	 Rarely,	 if	ever,	core	 technologies	have	been	
developed without strong public supportive 
mechanisms,
•	 During	 these	 long	periods	one	can	observe	
an interaction between technological 
change and public policies, which cannot be 
classified within one discernible pattern,
•	 Often	public	policies	alternate	between	pro-
active and reactive forms according to the 
specific evolutions and needs,
•	 In	 this	 interaction,	 reactive	 policies	 can	
under certain conditions have also a pro-
active nature. 
Externalities and the issue of efficient 
policy making
If correct, the above considerations mean 
that in some cases we are faced with a kind of 
public goods which require more active policies 
in the aim to capture externalities and to provide 
a collective service which the market alone is not 
able to offer. If the principle of active policies is to 
be answered positively, then the “how” becomes 
the open and significant question. The legitimate 
prioritisation of some objectives does not ensure 
the success of policy intervention. It does not 
eliminate the difficulty of answering how to 
deal with governance failures and inefficiencies. 
Hence, the question is how to minimize risks 
of all kind (risks of failure, of high cost and of 
delays of technical advancements) while ensuring 
performance. 
A policy option: Flexibility coupled with 
minimizing risks
The effective implementation of pro-active 
policies depends largely on the articulation of 
the policy mix and the definition of clear and 
efficient policy objectives. Experience shows 
that voluntarism and a top-down approach 
have limited chances to succeed. Bureaucratic 
inefficiencies, political considerations, embedded 
interests make such approaches inflexible and 
inefficient. On the other side, neutral policies 
are associated with inertia and short-termism. 
However, options are not restricted within 
these two extreme choices. It is conceivable 
to focus selectively on key technological areas 
and organize a flexible and diversified policy 
framework for facilitating the evolution of 
specialisations. Pro-active policies at the EU (and 
national) level can aim at a “research friendly 
ecology” (Georghiou, 2007) but combined with 
a “cluster-specific environment”. They have to 
be based on the co-evolution of the following 
elements:
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ns•	 To	 define	 priorities	 on	 selected	 areas	 and	
design a package of policies to support the 
research activities of firms, and research 
organisations and, in particular, innovative 
ideas and research proposals.
•	 To	alter	the	concept	and	the	criteria	to	judge	
the success of R&D and technology policies, 
especially the coherence, the efficiency, 
the long-term commitment and the time 
framework within which policies have to be 
implemented.
•	 Strengthening	of	R&D	specialisation	foremost	
implies policies enhancing variety creation 
and selection, and supporting "differentiation" 
elements against competitors.
•	 To	 achieve	 a	 good	 functional	 coordination	
of research activities, social needs, new 
knowledge, learning activities, public 
demand, inter-country cooperation schemes.
•	 To	cooperate	closely	with	the	business	sector	
and the scientific community in detecting 
needs, capabilities, technological trends, key 
discoveries, possible advancements.
•	 To	 be	 flexible	 enough	 to	 adopt	 timely	
institutional arrangements, incentives, types of 
financing, priorities and/or complementary and 
supportive policies to the changing conditions.
•	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 transformation	of	 the	
specialisation patterns is associated with 
path-dependent and evolutionary processes, 
R&D specialisation policies have to follow 
also an evolutionary and gradual approach 
and hence reduce the risk of serious failures.
•	 To	 provide	 timely	 new	 infrastructures	
encouraging the absorption and application 
of new knowledge.
•	 To	 focus	 on	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 favourable	
general framework which can target specific 
knowledge areas, is facilitating new entrants, 
is favouring competition, is not associated 
to specific agents and, in general, makes the 
preservation of a competitive ecology a key 
ingredient of policy making.
•	 To	learn	from	policies	and	practices	of	third	
countries.
The above elements imply also that in the 
framework of the ERA the support of high tech 
clusters is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for successful policies. What is essential is to 
shape governance structures in ways that can 
implement timely and effectively R&D and 
technological policies. Success is codetermined 
by a range of additional elements:
•	 an	 appropriate	 coordination	 at	 European	
level of public organisations, business firms 
and research communities, each of which 
has different interests, priorities, or strategies 
(e.g. on the appropriation of new knowledge) 
and functions,
•	 policies	 promoting	 existing	 or	 emerging	
technologies, instead to proceed on a 
voluntaristic base have to rely on the signals of 
the (research, innovation, product) market, and
•	 the	 capability	 to	 design	 and	 implement	
effectively appropriate policies and 
governance of these policies (i.e. the national 
innovative capacity) in a long-term period, 
since the effectiveness of policies often 
depends on:
a) the way they can meet successfully the 
above conditions,
b) the complementarities with other 
policies,
c) the broader economic environment,
d) the supportive activities, and
e) the social capabilities to adjust and to 
exploit opportunities. 
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The ERA can facilitate the development of 
a range of high-tech milieus with internal and 
external interactions, linkages with business 
partners and public research organisations, 
with specific and costly infrastructures. It can 
enhance the creation of high-tech clusters and 
communities of joint research and technology 
targets. Such poles of excellence could be 
engaged in the promotion of emerging new 
technologies with crucial economic and/or social 
implications. The development of such high 
tech milieus is justified from the critical mass of 
resources (financial and human, physical and soft 
infrastructures) which are needed but cannot be 
provided in the framework of existing policies 
at lower levels of governance. Frontier research 
is not a question of percentage spending to GDP 
but of absolute amounts of available resources. In 
such a perspective the ERA can enhance research 
and technological change enabling both the 
leveraging of continuous change, adaptation, and 
competitive strengthening of industrial structures 
as well as the unfolding of emerging new techno-
economic paradigms.
 
It should be added that R&D and technology 
specialisation policies should not limit their scope 
on knowledge production. The diffusion aspect 
is of equal importance and this has often been 
neglected at the policy level. It is well known 
that one of the weaknesses of Europe is precisely 
the diffusion of new technologies throughout 
its industrial system, with the consequence of 
lagging behind technological leaders in terms 
of productivity and growth rates. Hence, in case 
of not sufficient trickle-down, the creation of 
new knowledge will not succeed in leveraging 
competitiveness, growth and standards of living. 
The element of cumulativeness with regard 
to scientific knowledge influences positively also 
the capabilities to enter new areas of knowledge, 
even if this knowledge is discontinuous and 
revolutionary in some respects (Zucker, Darby, et 
al., Furman, Porter, Stern). Often, new elements 
in new science fields are interconnected with old 
elements, which are transformed, incorporated 
and combined with the new elements leading 
to new mixes of knowledge. From the point of 
view of policy this implies that accumulated 
knowledge facilitates the transition to new 
research and technology areas. Societies with 
weaker capabilities will not be able to achieve 
such transitions. Gaps of such a kind cannot be 
closed without active policies, in particular RTD 
policies. In the present era of technological race as 
a source of competitive specialisation advantages, 
RTD coupled with appropriate structural policies 
should have a distinguished place also in 
cohesion strategies. Consequently, technological 
specialisation in the ERA has to be considered 
in the framework of a balanced approach, 
conciliating technological advancement and 
cohesion. 
The issues of cohesion and intra-EU 
convergence are a different but crucial aspect 
of R&D and technology specialisation strategies. 
Regarding specialisation in the framework of the 
ERA and from the cohesion point of view the 
issue has not yet been answered sufficiently. R&D 
and technological specialisation, if successful, to 
a large extent drives industrial specialisation and 
industrial specialisation drives competitiveness, 
growth, incomes and standards of living. Even 
if reality often differs from such a linearity, 
differential growth capabilities lead to divergences 
and raise the question of possible trade-offs. The 
Lisbon goals and the closing of the gap between 
the EU and the US in the crucial areas of research 
and technology performance explicitly or 
implicitly constitute a major objective for the EU. 
The same logic however, cannot but prevail also 
within the EU. 
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Introduction10
The topic of R&D specialisation is attracting 
growing attention11 in the context of the 
discussion on the future development of the 
European Research Area (ERA) (CEC, 2000; CEC, 
2007). Appropriate specialisation policies hold 
potential for improving:
•	 R&D	 productivity12, decomposed in terms 
of the volume of research output produced 
for a given level of inputs13 and the value14 of 
individual research outputs;
•	 Cohesion	 in	 the	 European	 research	 system,	
viewed in terms of its ability to act as a well 
connected and co-ordinated15 whole;
10 Acknowledgements: We thank Isi Saragossi, René van 
Bavel, Luisa Henriques, Jan Larosse and Stephàne 
Vankalck and the participants to the Barcelona seminar 
for their comments and suggestions on an earlier, 
extended draft of this note. All remaining errors and 
omissions are the responsibility of the authors. The 
views expressed are those of the authors and may not 
in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official 
position of the European Commission.
11 See Bonaccorsi (2005), Foray and Van Ark (2007), 
Georghiou et al. (2007), Marimón and de Graça 
Carvalho (2008a), Giannitsis (forthcoming)
12 One of the key recommendations of the Aho Report 
(Aho, 2006: VII) and also relating to the following 
features of the ERA outlined in CEC (2007: 2): world-
class research infrastructures, excellent research 
institutions.
13 e.g. the number of patents/scientific publications 
“produced” for a given level of R&D expenditure or a 
given number of R&D personnel.
14 e.g. as reflected in the number of citations received by 
individual scientific works.
15 Relating to the following features of the ERA outlined 
in CEC (2007: 2): an adequate flow of competent 
researchers, effective knowledge sharing, well-
coordinated research programmes and priorities, a wide 
opening of the ERA to the world. 
•	 Flexibility	 in	 the	 European	 research	 system	
and, in particular, its ability to shift resources 
in response to the emergence of novel 
scientific and technological fields. 
These are worthy policy objectives. However, 
as we discuss here, some evolving specialisation 
patterns (whether natural or policy-induced) might 
be difficult to reconcile with progress in all three 
areas. The success of policies on specialisation 
rests on an informed understanding of possible 
trade-offs.
We attempt to delineate the place of policy 
by discussing the expectations attached to 
specialisation. To that end, we present a sketch of 
the policy options currently on offer and propose 
an alternative approach that overcomes many of 
the underlying dilemmas, before concluding with 
some suggestions for the construction of a robust 
evidence base.
By way of a definition
Research actors, at all conceivable levels 
of aggregation - from the EU as a whole, its 
constituent member states and their regions, 
down to individual organisations, project teams 
and researchers - focus their efforts in particular 
directions. In other words, they specialise within 
specific scientific disciplines and domains of 
technology. 
At its simplest, R&D specialisation can 
be understood as the relative concentration of 
activity in a specific thematic area, be it scientific, 
R&D Specialisation in the EU: From stylised observations 
to evidence-based policy10
Dimitrios Pontikakisa, George Chorafakisb and Dimitrios Kyriakoua
aInstitute for Prospective Technological Studies 
Joint Research Centre, European Commission
bResearch Directorate General, European Commission
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technological or even industrial, within a given 
“division of labour” in knowledge production. 
For a given level of aggregation, specialisation 
therefore refers to a distribution of R&D activity. 
Thus conceptualised, one may imagine two 
opposite extremes of this distribution; one in 
which activity is evenly spread among thematic 
areas and another in which activity is concentrated 
in one major thematic area, with various 
intermediate stages in-between. By definition, 
more specialisation in one thematic area implies 
less in another. Naturally then, the specific 
shape of the distribution, and the justification for 
changing it, will depend on whether the benefits 
from concentration in one area outweigh the 
costs of foregone research in others.
Specialisation makes economic sense when 
there are sufficient exchange mechanisms in place 
to enable the sourcing of essential inputs that are 
not produced with own efforts. By this analogy, 
efficient research specialisation at the level of the 
EU implies an elaborate division of labour among 
connected and inter-complementary research 
systems, or a “system of research systems”. 
Stylised relationships
The most obvious opportunities afforded 
by policy-induced specialisation concern the 
productivity of research systems, an economic 
measure, closely linked with effectiveness – 
which is often the implicit or explicit concern 
of policy discussions on research “quality” and 
“excellence”. In theory, these opportunities can 
be considerable:
•	 Free-up	resources	from	sub-critical	areas	&	
permit economies of scale.
The thematic concentration implied by 
specialisation frees up resources that would 
be otherwise dissipating in numerous sub-
critical areas and thus facilitates economies 
of scale (Foray and Van Ark, 2007; 
Georghiou et al. 2007). These are even more 
pronounced at the context of research, given 
the “indivisibilities16” associated with the 
production of knowledge (Arrow, 1962). 
 
•	 Benefits	from	cumulative	learning	&	spatial	
agglomeration.
When a particular thematic 
specialisation is systematically pursued and 
built-upon over time, cumulative learning 
enables increases in R&D productivity and 
entrenches the comparative advantage of 
specialised research actors. As highlighted 
by Foray and Van Ark (2007), when increases 
in scale are focused within a particular 
geographic space and sustained over time, 
other forms of cumulative advantage kick-
in; top researchers attract other talented 
scientists and gain further research funding 
in a positive-feedback loop that facilitates 
excellence – a so-called “agglomeration 
process”. 
•	 Permit	 focus	 on	 thematic	 areas	 with	 the	
most low-hanging fruit.
Moreover, the orientation itself is 
important. Some thematic areas are, by 
nature, more productive; the rapid pace 
of change in microprocessor design 
(popularised in the proverbial – if only 
partially accurate17 - Moore’s “law”) and 
ICT in general, make this point abundantly 
clear. While Computer Science and ICT are 
the most widely known examples in science 
and technology respectively, they are by no 
means special. Other, less visible thematic 
areas including biotechnologies, the life 
sciences and perhaps nanotechnology 
16 As highlighted by Arrow (1962), scientific discoveries 
and technological inventions are “indivisible” in the 
sense that they are intricately linked with an accumulated 
stock of past knowledge (i.e. a “standing on the shoulder 
of giants” effect) and are only purposeful when they are 
achieved in their entirety (scale effect) –For example, 
the practical benefits emanating from decoding say 10, 
20 or even 99 per cent of the human genome pale by 
comparison to the benefits stemming from an integral 
unravelling of its properties.
17 See Tuomi (2002).
73
Th
e 
Q
ue
st
io
n 
of
 R
&
D
 S
pe
ci
al
is
at
io
n:
 P
er
sp
ec
tiv
es
 a
nd
 p
ol
ic
y 
im
pl
ic
at
io
nsalso yield more than average “bang per 
buck”. These generally novel thematic 
areas are commonly thought to hold more 
technological opportunities (Dosi, 1988), 
be more fertile (Schmookler, 1954; 1966) or 
characterised by divergent search regimes 
(Bonaccorsi, 2005) and have, as it were, 
more low-hanging fruit for R&D to harvest. 
•	 Exposure	to	international	competition.
By focusing on thematic areas at the 
scientific or technological frontier, specialisation 
fosters international connectedness, which in 
turn has a “raising the bar18” effect, exposing 
hitherto protected enclaves to the effects of 
international competition. More focused 
specialisation at the EU level, would imply that 
R&D resources which hold little relevance to 
international concerns are no longer sheltered 
by national systems and policies (Foray and 
Van Ark, 2007).
However, the well-known economic 
arguments, suggesting that there are gains 
to be had from specialisation, in general, 
are accompanied by caveats regarding their 
applicability to specific contexts:
•	 The	 level	 of	 inputs	 and	 the	 spectre	 of	
diminishing returns.
All other things being equal, the output 
of research systems does not increase 
linearly with the scale of inputs (e.g. R&D 
expenditures); that is the relationship follows 
a sigmoid pattern, with low (but increasing) 
returns for low levels of inputs, highest 
returns for medium levels of input and low 
(but diminishing) returns again for high 
levels of input. It is clear though that different 
research systems find themselves at different 
points along this curve, and by extension, 
also differ with respect to their receptiveness 
to increases in inputs; for systems positioned 
18 The use of the term in this context (although in a different 
line of reasoning) is due to Porter and Stern (2000).
on the diminishing returns stage, the increases 
in inputs implied by specialisation would 
have a negative effect on R&D productivity.
•	 Scale	diseconomies.
Excessive specialisation could also have 
long run implications for R&D productivity. 
As scale increases more broadly, (i.e. not just 
increases in expenditures, but also a more 
numerous workforce, better infrastructures 
etc.) the efficient organisation, control and 
administration of research projects becomes 
more difficult and above certain thresholds, 
diseconomies of scale can be expected. 
Within a specific thematic area (e.g. discipline 
/ technological domain) scale diseconomies 
may be due to demand saturation or the 
exhaustion of technological opportunities 
(Schmookler, 1954; 1966; Dosi, 1988). 
•	 The	bluntness	of	change.
In their natural state most research 
systems exhibit constant returns to scale 
over time (see Madsen, 2007), despite 
the fact that inputs also tend to gradually 
increase from one year to the next. The key 
word in the previous sentence is gradually. 
Gradual increases in inputs can happen 
hand-in-hand with gradual adjustments in 
institutional structures that, together with 
cumulative learning, allow for the productive 
deployment of the newly available resources 
and maintaining the input/output ratio. In the 
absence of proportional adjustments in these 
proximate areas, there is no guarantee that a 
windfall increase in resources will result in a 
concomitant increase in outputs19. 
•	 The	need	for	experience	and	critical	mass	in	
a proximate area.
Not all research agents can specialise 
in areas which hold the greatest promise for 
19 This observation is partly based on research suggesting 
that, all other things equal, the productivity of R&D is 
sensitive to sudden increases in inputs (Pontikakis, 2008).
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further technological change. Their willingness 
and ability to re-align their thematic orientation, 
and do so successfully, will partly depend on 
their historical experience with proximate 
areas of research and the accumulated 
set of skills, research infrastructures, inter-
institutional linkages and financial networks 
that go with this experience. 
In addition to the above, “qualified” 
implications, artificial increases in 
specialisation may have the following, more 
broadly applicable negative consequences:
•	 Spatial	implications	and	EU	cohesion
Related to the previous point, precisely 
because of the cumulative advantage of some 
regions over others, thematic specialisation 
will have important spatial implications; 
regions with a prior stock of experience and 
resources will be more likely to benefit from 
agglomeration processes20, leaving regions 
whose profile does not happen to match 
the emerging trend lagging behind. A trade-
off between concentration and cohesion, is 
implied if only because more concentration 
to a particular discipline and/or spatial unit, 
means that there remain fewer potential nodes 
to connect to, effectively leaving large parts 
of the EU disconnected from the ERA. “Too 
much” specialisation may lock research agents 
(or groups thereof) into mutually incompatible 
skill-sets, paradigmatic modi operandi and 
infrastructures, thus narrowing the potential 
pool of talent and resources that each one can 
individually draw from; in such a situation, the 
restricted sampling of human resources and 
funding calls may have an adverse effect on 
the quality of research (Bonaccorsi, 2005). 
Insofar as increased specialisation has 
spatial implications, it will also have direct 
consequences for the absorptive capacity of 
20 This is supported by the findings of Clarysse and Muldur 
(2001).
regions. Depriving regions from a minimum 
threshold of research activity could diminish 
their ability to learn and reap productive 
benefits. Crucially, insofar as policy-induced 
specialisation is concerned, visionary 
regional and national policy makers may have 
little sympathy for the suggestion that each 
region possesses inalterable comparative 
advantages and should therefore be content 
with “finding its place” in a knowledge 
production hierarchy.
•	 Effects	on	competition.
Perhaps the gravest threat associated with 
increases in concentration, has to do with 
its effects in terms of limiting competition. 
Though one may think of research agents 
conducting research in similar areas as 
engaging in wasteful duplication, it is worth 
remembering that duplication is an inevitable 
side-effect of competing in the same area. As 
long as selection mechanisms based on merit 
and adequate communication channels are 
in place, a measure of duplication will need 
to be welcomed (for many member states 
(MS) even at the sub-national level, and 
almost certainly at the EU level) in order to 
develop the competitive qualities that permit 
shifting the global STI frontier21. A multiplicity 
of funders will also be needed (Marimón and 
de Graça Carvalho, 2008b). 
•	 Reductions	in	variety.
Reductions in variety are another 
corollary of “too much” specialisation. 
These can constrain opportunities for new 
entrants and undermine the potential for 
new innovations to emerge. In science, 
21 An analogous argument is made by Marimón and de 
Graça Carvalho (2008b: 2): “A “fair competitive field” 
means that there are institutions and rules that guarantee 
fair R&D competition, but it also means that each region 
within the ERA has its own fair chance to compete and 
to become competitive. In an Integrated Research Area 
this goal can be achieved since the emergence of strong 
R&D agglomerations can, and must, go together with 
the development of a decentralized R&D and Higher 
Education base of excellence across all European regions.”
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of traditional disciplines and journals, and 
do not have stellar records that would be 
rewarded through a focus on “excellence” 
(Molas-Gallart and Salter, 2002). Importantly 
reductions in variety also imply;
•	 Loss	of	flexibility.
Moreover, in any production process 
faced with uncertainty, some redundancy is 
needed in order to deal with rapidly evolving 
needs. Insofar as increased concentration 
reduces variety in thematic specialisations 
(including those which fall below the visible 
threshold of existing thematic classifications) 
and constrains redundancy to a minimum, it 
may have adverse effects on the flexibility of 
the research system. 
More importantly though, loss of flexibility 
constrains opportunities for developing 
capacities in emerging fields of science 
and technology and, importantly, doing so 
first. Excessive specialisation may narrow 
the system’s ability to disengage from old 
techno-economic paradigms and associated 
search regimes, discourage research outside 
disciplinary bounds and place obstacles to 
the branching of scientific disciplines. Loss 
of variety implies loss of flexibility not only 
in cognitive aspects, but, crucially, in other 
aspects of the research system, such as the 
private financial markets that support it and 
the preferences of lead markets that use 
its products. An unfortunate confluence of 
the above elements could reduce the EU’s 
chances of “riding the wave” generated by the 
next technological “irruption” (Perez, 2002) 
and being the first to benefit from it. 
Rationale for specialisation-minded 
policies
Specialisation is an autonomous process. 
In an unfettered market individuals specialise 
motivated by the relative returns to specialisation 
apparent to them. Observed specialisation 
patterns represent aggregates of individual choices 
made by (boundedly-) rational economic agents. 
These choices are not taken at random but are the 
reflections of persistent economic fundamentals 
contingent on history and geography. What can 
be the purpose of policy in this context? 
Specialisation-minded policies can be 
advocated when there are benefits to the joint, co-
ordinated determination of specialisations which 
are, however, not apparent to individual research 
agents. At the EU level this implies coordination of 
the thematic orientation of regional and national 
research systems. However, all other things being 
equal, the concentration of resources could have 
different ramifications for different facets of the 
ERA. EU policy will have to perform a careful 
balancing act, which will become more difficult 
the more specific the thematic area and the more 
granulated the intended level of aggregation. 
At this stage two important pre-conditions 
for successful specialisation policies, whatever 
their exact shape, can be identified:
•	 Achieving	 an	 optimal	 balance	 –	 aiming	 for	
neither too much nor too little specialisation 
– with a definition of optimality that takes 
into account the ERA vision as a whole and 
its economic welfare implications as outlined 
in the Lisbon Strategy.
•	 Harnessing	 the	 benefits	 from	 specialisation	
within a research system partly depends on 
the degree to which its component parts are 
connected and function in a coordinated 
fashion.
Policy also has a role in shaping efficient 
institutional frameworks – what is often termed 
among some economists as “the rules of the 
game” (North, 1990). For instance as highlighted 
by Bonaccorsi (2005), many of the institutional 
structures that characterise European science 
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are better suited to the past. Policy can mould 
institutions with key changes in legislation, 
employment, education and welfare rules, the 
functioning of financial markets and the regulation 
of competition, among other things There are of 
course limits to what policy can do with regards 
to institutions; many institutions are socially-
embedded and for all practical purposes cannot 
be considered policy variables (Williamson, 
2000: 597). 
Implementation: first, do no harm
The policy challenge lies not only in deciding 
what to change but also in what to leave intact. 
The EU possesses carefully crafted policies and 
instruments for research that have served their 
current purpose well (Peterson and Sharp, 1998). 
Drastic interventions in the form of a top-down 
directed drive towards specialisation run the 
danger of disrupting otherwise efficient policy 
instruments. The bottom-up principles governing 
the allocation of grants in the Framework 
Programme for Research and Technological 
Development (FP) have been exemplary in 
allowing the funding of new initiatives and the 
emergence of new ideas (Luukkonen, 2001: 
215). That is not to say that changes in existing 
instruments will not be needed, but that their 
scope will need to be mapped carefully.
Moreover, policy takes time to elicit the 
intended outcomes. A string of recent policy 
interventions have set in motion processes that 
could contribute substantively to the realisation 
of the ERA vision. These include interventions 
that address the issues of R&D productivity22 /sub-
22 e.g. Networks of Excellence in FP6, the recent founding 
of the European Research Council (ERC) and the 
European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) 
were in part borne out of a desire to foster quality in 
European research. 
criticalities23, connectedness24 and coordination25, 
even though they were conceived before the 
current debate on specialisation. 
Caution is called for though, particularly 
where the evidence is still tentative and 
the specific target elusive: rush actions risk 
exchanging short-term and uncertain benefits for 
long-term and certain costs. 
New policies: a menu for choice
Various types of policies fostering 
specialisation can be envisaged. Policies of 
different types bring forth important governance 
issues; who decides in which thematic area to 
specialise and how? What types of instruments 
might be called to put into action such policies 
and what are the minimum conditions for success 
in each case? The following table summarises 
some hypothetical policies. These policies 
differ primarily with respect to the degree of 
centralisation in decision making they would 
require in order to make their own shade of 
specialisation work. 
•	 Centrally	administered	specialisation
The first option, “centrally administered 
specialisation”, involving a Soviet-style 
handing down of specialisations, has of 
course not been on the offering. It is also an 
obviously irrelevant mode of governance. 
Nevertheless its presence here is illustratory 
23 The EIT has an explicit mission to address areas lacking 
the “critical mass” necessary for innovation (CEC, 2008). 
Recent initiatives on European infrastructures such as 
Trans European Networks, the launch of the European 
Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) 
and the exploitation of Risk Sharing Finance Facilities, 
European Investment Bank (EIB) finance, the FPs and 
Structural Funds to that end.
24 The collaborative character of FP-funded research has 
been the hallmark of EU research policy for over two 
decades - with increasingly more resources devoted to it 
over time. More recent initiatives aiming at stimulating 
researcher mobility (e.g. the EURAXESS database, the 
EU scientific “visa” directive etc.) also serve this aim.
25 e.g. Open Method of Coordination (OMC), OMC-Net 
initiatives and the very well received ERANets.
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of an extreme variety of a top-down type 
of policy and evocative of the well-known 
economically inefficient and politically 
unpalatable consequences of extreme 
centralisation.
•	 Smart	specialisation
Foray and Van Ark (2007), in a Policy 
Brief of the KfG Expert Group argue that 
“smart specialisation” in research, at the level 
of countries or regions, holds considerable 
opportunities for facilitating agglomeration 
and excellence which in themselves may 
make the EU a more attractive destination for 
R&D investment. What is implicitly proposed 
here is a shift from the traditional (almost) 
thematically/regionally neutral and “generic” 
orientation of R&D funding instruments to 
a thematically/regionally focused one. The 
rationale behind “smart specialisation” has 
to do with avoiding duplication in thematic 
orientations between geographic areas. To 
counter duplication, they argue, regions with 
similar thematic aspirations may engage in 
“smart specialisation”. 
However, Foray and Van Ark (2007) do 
not discuss how such an ambitious policy 
might be put into action. A policy implying 
that some research actors or administrative 
units will be on the unlucky end of the 
concentration distribution inevitably raises 
the important issue of governance. How are 
they to be made to give up their research 
Table: Hypothetical policies and their implications
Type of 
policy / Aims
Relevant 
spatial level
Who 
decides?
How are 
decisions 
taken?
Criteria for 
resource 
distribution
How are 
decisions 
implemented?
Minimum 
conditions for 
implementation
Centrally-
administered 
specialisation
Transnational, 
National
EU, MS Foresight, 
Benchmarking
Past-
performance, 
evidence of 
sub-criticalities, 
sectoral / 
disciplinary 
dynamism
R&D budget 
priorities, 
S&T skills 
micromanagement 
Sovereign state 
/ Distributional 
offsets / absence 
of stochastic 
stocks / full info. 
on emerging fields
Smart 
specialisation
(Foray and Van 
Ark, 2007)
Regional & 
transnational, 
national, 
supranational
EU, MS regional 
authorities
Benchmarking, 
Priority setting
Past-
performance, 
evidence of sub-
criticalities,
comparative 
advantage
R&D budget 
priorities, fiscal 
incentives, 
S&T skills 
micromanagement
Distributional 
offsets, absence 
of stochastic 
stocks, full info. on 
emerging fields
Networked 
specialisation
(Georghiou et 
al, 2007)
Supranational, 
national, 
regional
EU, national 
and regional 
authorities, 
research 
performing 
org., individual. 
research 
agents (teams/ 
researchers)
Case studies/ 
Foresight, 
Statistical 
identification of 
related variety, 
Social goals 
(“Grand 
Challenges”), 
related variety, 
needs of a 
“research-
friendly ecology”
R&D budget 
priorities, fiscal 
incentives, 
institutional 
interventions
Mechanisms for 
connectedness and 
coordination, full 
info. on emerging 
fields
Enhancing 
shifting 
capacity
Supranational, 
national, 
regional
Research 
funders, 
research 
performing org.,
individual 
research 
agents (teams/ 
researchers)
Case studies, 
scenario 
modelling of 
component 
flexibility
Not applicable Institutional 
interventions
Mechanisms for 
connectedness and 
coordination
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aspirations? Responding to Foray and Van 
Ark (2007), the Director of Directorate 
General for Regional Policy, Natalija 
Kazlauskiene·  (2007: 5) argues that top-down 
interventions would be both undesirable and 
impracticable. With his contribution to the 
present volume, Dominique Foray attempts 
to clarify and operationalise the approach.
•	 Networked	Specialisation
Georghiou et al. (2007) in their report 
on “ERA Rationales” are enthusiastic about 
the potential of policies for specialisation 
and argue for a model of “networked 
specialisation”. Georghiou et al. (2007) 
recognise the narrow scope for policy 
manoeuvring at the level of the EU and 
offer clear guidance regarding the role of 
specialisation policies in a multi-layered 
governance setting. They also emphasise the 
importance of communication and exchange 
mechanisms for the long-term sustainability 
of R&D specialisations and hence talk of 
networks, where the nodes are many and 
flows are bi-directional.
As Georghiou (2008) argues elsewhere, 
some scope for top-down policy would 
remain in particular with regards to aligning 
European research with broad26 societal 
issues (the so-called “Grand-Challenges”), 
e.g. related to energy and the environment.
On the question of an “optimal” level of 
specialisation, Georghiou et al. (2007) refer 
to the promising concept of related variety, a 
statistical measure that attempts to single out 
useful shades of variety from irrelevant ones on 
the basis of thematic proximity (Cantwell and 
Iammarino, 2001; Boschma and Iammarino, 
2007). However, its usefulness as an indicator on 
which to base policy decisions is limited: Many 
26 A broad sectoral focus of EU research and innovation 
policy was outlined in the Aho Report (Aho, 2006): 
e-health, pharmaceuticals, transport and logistics, 
environment, digital content industry.
thematic classifications group together subfields 
that could belong to multiple and sizeable 
interdisciplinary strands of research. Moreover, 
inasmuch as operationalisations of related 
variety are based on existing (and one may 
add, slowly changing) thematic classifications27, 
these are ex post assessments of relatedness. 
Simply put, measurements of related variety 
may underrepresent (or miss altogether) the 
opportunities afforded by emerging fields and 
fields that have yet-to-emerge that, by nature 
cannot be given a heading before they do so, 
and as a result often “fall through the cracks” of 
existing thematic classifications. If the concept 
is taken at face value, emerging fields could be 
missed altogether.
In our view the “networked specialisation” 
concept, as has been put forward, would 
demand a multiple role of policy. This would 
almost certainly involve ensuring the provision 
of relevant and timely information, facilitate 
co-ordination and cooperation and cater, 
along with MS, for long-term institutional 
interventions. 
The flow of information between those who 
take specialisation decisions will be a key aspect, 
requiring diverse instruments. At the level of 
individual researchers and project teams this is 
arguably already happening through conferences/
research publications etc. The hard part which the 
approach needs to address is the role of funders 
(regional/national – research councils, ministries 
etc) as well as research organisations managers 
and university administrators.
•	 Enhancing	shifting	capacity
The success of a directed policy towards 
specialisation rests on a delicate and costly 
to maintain and implement balance of 
27 e.g. ISIC/NACE sectoral classifications, THOMSON ISI’s 
classifications of scientific disciplines, international 
patent classes (WIPO IPC), ISCO-88 professions, ISCED 
fields of education to mention but a few elaborate 
thematic classifications of relevance.
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such costly acrobatics presents itself in the form of 
proactive policies aiming to cultivate pre-existing 
tendencies and thus foster the organic emergence 
of socially desirable outcomes – as opposed to 
reactive policies that arise in response to market 
failures. These involve fostering desired systemic 
qualities by way of key institutional interventions. 
These are interventions that would not favour any 
one particular thematic distribution, but would 
rather nurture the ability of the system to change 
rapidly in response to exogenous stimuli (such 
as e.g. the emergence of a new discipline / area 
of technology) and assume whatever distribution 
approximates optimality: in other words what we 
term its “shifting capacity”28.
Promoting shifting capacity would take 
more than a distributional mechanism to channel 
resources in the most promising thematic areas 
or the most efficient research agents (though 
improvements in shifting capacity would by 
definition induce improvements there too). It 
would entail a much wider ability to systematically, 
rapidly, and efficiently deploy resources, both 
old, and importantly, new, towards continuously 
changing needs in scale-dependent emerging 
areas, where the window of opportunity is small 
and the cost of not acting enormous.
The need for institutional change
Of course, let’s not forget the elephant in 
the room: the emergence of ICT in the US and 
its successful economic exploitation there is 
purported to be the major culprit behind the gap 
in total factor productivity between Europe and 
the US (Aho, 2006). The prospect of managing 
to specialise in those emerging fields that give 
28 The contrast between, on the one hand, the ability of 
countries to promote “shifting” from old to new uses 
and, on the other hand, “deepening” or improving 
their productivity in existing uses (loosely analogous to 
specialisation) can be traced back to Ergas (1987: 223). 
Crescenzi et al. (2007: 676) are the first to refer to the 
“shifting” quality of national systems as a “capacity”.
rise to new industries and contribute to the 
development of a comparative advantage dwarfs 
other issues in importance. The trouble is we 
do not know what these emerging fields will be 
before they emerge, and the scope for action is 
limited once they do so. In that respect, shifting 
capacity, in terms of increasing preparedness 
and allowing nimble, rapid-deployment would 
be the key quality. 
Flexibility is also called for in the design of 
institutions themselves. Institutional interventions 
will have to vary both in the cross section 
dimension (i.e. across disciplines, technological 
fields and geographically across states and 
regions) and over time. Introspective efforts to 
improve the ability of policy making systems to 
change their-own-selves will be necessary.
In a classic essay, Nelson (1994) describes the 
institutional conditions that favour the emergence 
of new industrial sectors and the co-evolution 
of institutions and industrial structure over time. 
He posits that one set of institutional qualities 
is needed in preparing for the arrival of the next 
“dominant design” (a term loosely analogous to 
a techno-economic paradigm) and another one 
once it has emerged. According to Nelson (1994), 
before a dominant design is established, the 
chances of benefiting from it depend on the ease 
of getting funding, the degree to which markets 
are open to new sources of supply, the speed 
with which universities adapt to new sciences, 
how adaptable legal structures are to changing 
demands put on them by new technologies 
and how supportive public sector programs are 
of novelty. By the time a new dominant design 
is apparent, the ability to finance large scale 
investment and train labour with specific skills 
comes into the spotlight. A rich ecosystem 
of institutions is likely to emerge afterwards, 
including industry associations, professional 
societies and technological standards, that co-
evolve and add to the dynamism of the nascent 
industrial sectors.
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Strengthening the evidence base
ERA-specific evidence is still rather anecdotal, 
particularly with regards to the implications of 
specialisation for different research systems at 
various levels of aggregation, as well as to its 
broader economic welfare consequences. A 
revisit of the important work of Archibugi and 
Pianta (1992) on the determinants of national 
R&D specialisation patterns is now long overdue. 
A renewal and extension of this analysis at the 
regional level would go some way towards 
identifying important policy levers and informing 
the design of appropriate instruments, whatever 
policy approach is taken.
Obtaining a more complete picture of the so-
called “untraded flows of knowledge”29 (Smith, 
2000: 100), including a better understanding of 
their consequences will be essential. Establishing 
for instance the extent to which increased 
networking and collaboration in European 
research activity (as promoted by the FPs and 
proposed by the “networked specialisation” 
concept) can substitute geographic agglomeration 
and help build “virtual critical mass” would 
illuminate a key question on the debate. 
A stronger evidence base will hinge on the 
timely availability of appropriate specialisation 
indicators. As Phil Cooke and Keith Smith argue 
in this volume, current indicators are unable to 
provide answers to some of the most pressing 
questions. Novel indicators that measure not 
only variation in the concentration/diversity30axis 
(whether relative or absolute) but also convey 
the internal composition of R&D and of the 
29 These include personal interactions (through e.g. 
human resource mobility), codified knowledge flows 
(as they register in scientific and technical literature) 
as well as other flows that currently remain below the 
visible threshold (e.g. flows emanating from public 
domain sources, marketing relationships, co-operative 
knowledge exchange, trade literature etc) (mostly Smith, 
2000: 100).
30 E.g. Herfindahl (concentration), variations of Balassa, 
Ellison and Glaeser (relative concentration), Shannon 
(diversity) etc.
degree of its structural change31over time seem 
necessary. The systematic collection of data in 
and compilation of indicators on relatedness32 
(horizontal similarity, vertical position) seems 
also profitable. Such novel measures could, 
with the application of an appropriate modelling 
framework that combines them with other 
variables of significance, help gauge the effects 
of different specialisation patterns on R&D 
productivity, EU cohesion and the flexibility 
of research systems. Follow up studies that 
seek to identify the determinants of variation in 
specialisation could also be of direct interest 
to policy – particularly with respect to shifting 
capacity.
Useful insights for policy will not come 
from any one analytical tool alone. As summary 
measures, statistics inevitably imply a loss of 
information; even if the remaining information 
were otherwise perfect, this loss, combined with 
the inevitable lag in obtaining such, drastically 
limit its usefulness to the policy planner. 
Research from multiple angles will be needed, 
complementing quantitative work with topical 
case studies and foresight analysis.
31 E.g. indicators of proximity to dominant design / major 
technoeconomic paradigms, and of shifting capacity 
(degree of responsiveness)
32 E.g. related variety (Theil’s entropy), but also those 
that establish relatedness empirically, including e.g. 
technological proximity (thematic shares correlations), 
vertical linkages derived from input-output tables etc.
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